VOL. XIX

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-vs-

10-CR-219S

TONAWANDA COKE CORPORATION MARK L. KAMHOLZ,

Defendants.

Proceedings held before the

Honorable William M. Skretny, U.S.

Courthouse, 2 Niagara Circle, Buffalo,

New York on March 27, 2013.

APPEARANCES:

AARON J. MANGO, Assistant United States Attorney, ROCKY PIAGGIONE, Senior Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Appearing for the United States.

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Appearing for Tonawanda Coke Corporation.

RODNEY PERSONIUS, ESQ., Appearing for Mark L. Kamholz.

Also Present: Lauren DiFillipo, Paralegal Sheila Henderson, Paralegal

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(Jury not present in the courtroom.)

THE COURT: And I don't mind if there is a little bit of activity going on, as long as it's not too noisy. But I think the attorneys and parties are back here.

You want to call the case, please, Colleen?

THE CLERK: Criminal case number

2010-CR-219, United States versus Tonawanda Coke
and Mark Kamholz.

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning to all.

MR. LINSIN: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. As far as where we left off yesterday, I think as we sent you off into the blue skies, I think, before it got dark last night, we talked a little bit about the verdict form and the charge. And I had given you the documents relating to the changes that we suggested on a number of the charges and asked to you take a look at it.

I don't think, Mr. Moeller, we didn't get anything from anybody yet?

LAW CLERK: Just the definitions from the government.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Do we have anything to discuss as far as the proposed charges

are concerned?

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, I apologize. I didn't know you were expecting to get something in writing from us on these. The only points that I would raise were the ones we had mentioned during our brief discussion yesterday, that we thought that the -- there should be a parallel addition to the introductory paragraph for Count 19 parallel to what was added for 17 and 18.

And then with respect to draft charge number 57, it is our view that there should be two RCRA instructions, one for 17 and then a joint one for 18 and 19. And we believe that the one for 17 should break out the two factual findings into two elements, findings that are joined by the underscored "and" in the draft charge. We believe those are separate factual findings and should be set out as two distinct elements.

Other than that, we are comfortable with the modifications that are reflected in these draft charges.

THE COURT: Okay. And I think, you know, it's -- the timing to talk about this, I think, is good. I'm not sure the jury is here yet.

Mr. Mango, you can live with that, I take it?

MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor. With respect to that count, I think we've discussed that in detail already, so we can live with that. The one thing that I did want to check into -- and there is quite, actually, a complicated regulatory history behind using that word "required." This is going back to charge -- charge 54, which has all of the RCRA counts in one, which I understand may -- well, that may stay, because it's the indictment and the statute. That may stay as is. It was, I believe, 57 that may get broken out.

But in 54, that term at the end, "Tonawanda Coke Corporation without a required permit," we would ask that "required" be taken out of that and not used. It's not an element of the crime, that's not what RCRA says, and there is this other complicated regulatory history, which I can go through. There is a Second Circuit case law discussing whether the EPA has the ability even to require someone to get a permit. But if there's no objection, I don't think we need to go into that.

So I would just ask that "required" be taken out.

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, I'm not going to belabor this point. I believe that it would be helpful, but I don't -- if -- I'm comfortable with

it reading "without a permit," so I would accede to that recommendation.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Personius, you're on board?

MR. PERSONIUS: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. And then I think we're good.

MR. MANGO: Your Honor, the one thing -- I don't know if we were going to discuss separately -- move to the special verdict form.

The other item that you asked us to look into was whether the entrapment by estoppel defense statement should be in that. And we're prepared to argue -- we forcefully believe it should not be in the special verdict form. And if you want to hear our argument, we can present that now, or if that was going to be covered separately.

THE COURT: No -- the jury's here?

Okay. We still have a little time, so I'll hear you out. I take it the defense position is that the estoppel by defense addendum should be included on all the charges but for the obstruction of justice?

MR. LINSIN: It is, your Honor. We have some recommendations as to how we believe it should

be incorporated. We think it is imperative that it be included on each of those counts, and we have some thoughts as to how that can be done without being too cumbersome.

THE COURT: Okay. Do we have the draft available on that? Yeah, the draft of the form -- of the verdict form with the added language? No, we didn't do that? Okay.

Okay. Yeah, we had discussed it. Yeah, we'll hear you out on that, and I'll hear the government first with its opposition, and then we'll go forward with a decision on it.

MR. MANGO: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, I would note at the outset here that the Second Circuit -- it is well settled in the Second Circuit -- and I've got cases. The two principle cases that I'll cite -- I have copies for defense and the Court if you want them, or I'll give the cite. In United States v. Bell, Second Circuit case, 2009, 584 F.3d 478, the court said -- in this case it's a very interesting case, because this was a -- facts involved an execution of a search warrant on a gas station, and a person who was in the back room saw police come in with vests on which said "police," but still was apparently under

the mistaken assumption that they weren't police.

He pulled a gun out, fired a couple of shots at somebody, one of the police officers; they exchanged fire. And then he was indicted on assault. He was indicted on the attempted murder of a federal officer.

And at -- at trial the court gave a general verdict form, which, in fact, I think for most of the counts in the indictment, this is a general verdict form. Because for Count 1 it just says here's the indictment, how do you find, guilty or not guilty. So I think this is a general verdict form for most of the counts.

And that's what happened in this case, in Bell.

And then the jury convicted the defendant of most of the counts, not the attempted murder count, and sua sponte, on its own, the district court, similar to what we have here, your Honor, sua sponte raised this issue. Said, "I think there was error in the trial. I'm going to grant a new trial."

And in part of -- there was two reasons for that. One, on that there was a flawed definition of "intentional conduct," which doesn't relate, but second, the use of a general verdict form rather than a special form that would have addressed the

specific elements of the charged offenses and the burdens of self-defense. Self-defense is an affirmative defense similar to entrapment by estoppel.

And the court goes on, the Second Circuit —
the government then appealed, because they believed
they had an appropriate conviction. The Second
Circuit weighed this and said, "Nor can we conclude
that the use of a general verdict form" — also not
contested by the parties — "was error of any sort
that could serve as the basis for ordering a new
trial. As it happens, there is a historical
preference for general verdicts and a traditional
distaste for special interrogatories in criminal
cases."

And it goes on to say, "The district court more than adequately addressed the issue of self-defense and its important [sic] for deliberation in its charge to the jury."

THE COURT: What's the year of that case?

MR. MANGO: 2009.

THE COURT: Okay. I mean, that traditionally has been the Second Circuit's position. But, as you know, as things evolve with issues in drug cases concerning whether or not

there's a controlled substance, whether or not there's a certain threshold quantity that's met or not met, and whether the jury unanimously finds below or beyond -- above a threshold, the verdict forms become a modified general verdict form so that the juries can address that.

So while, you know, I understand that that basically states the preference for general verdicts where, you know, there are no other issues, I'll take that into account. In fact we talked about that last night in terms of the circuit going on record in that regard.

But -- yeah, go ahead.

MR. MANGO: A couple more points, your
Honor, if I may. I'm sorry to impose on the Court
here. There is a 2008 Ninth Circuit case, United
States versus Ramirez. That's 537 F.3d 1075. And
in that case the court -- the defendant
specifically asked for a special verdict form on
the defense of self-defense, and the court refused
to give it. It went on appeal, and the Ninth
Circuit said it wasn't error to refuse that. Now,
I know that's the Ninth Circuit. In this case --

THE COURT: Yeah. It's not always good law in the Second Circuit, as you know,

Mr. Mango -- the Ninth Circuit. And, in fact, I mean, I learned my lesson, because I had a choice just a couple of weeks ago on a case that hadn't been -- or an issue that hadn't been really decided in the Second Circuit. There was a Ninth Circuit case and a Sixth Circuit case, and I went with the Ninth Circuit rationale. Second Circuit thought the Sixth Circuit was a little bit better. So, you know, I'm going to be a little bit cautious on the Ninth Circuit authority here.

MR. MANGO: I understand, your Honor.

But, more seriously, the point is that

yesterday the government -- and I don't want to

revisit the argument. It was settled. We objected

to the -- to the instruction of entrapment by

estoppel on all counts except for Count 16. I

mean, in the government's view it's not warranted.

There's no evidence, just for example, say for

Count 17, the storage around the tanks, that

somehow that was implicitly authorized. There's

nothing in any of the records that anybody saw

these tanks.

So that coupled with the decision -- and I'm not going to say it right, but Abcasis, I think it's Abcasis, where the court goes on to say that

this -- this defense of entrapment by estoppel is -- is something that -- it should be used with great caution. Great caution should be exercised when it comes to the application of this defense.

And in this case -- and there's other cases, actually a Hawaiian case, that cites Abcasis, which talks about government malfeasance, which is essentially the government's position here, that they just -- they just didn't do the job, if that's -- and that's the theory of entrapment by estoppel -- that that doesn't warrant an entrapment by estoppel defense.

So, again, I'm not trying to revisit that. The Court has ruled; the instruction is ruled. But when this -- if and when this goes to the Second Circuit, with that language of "great caution should be used when using this defense," and that coupled with the Second Circuit's stated preference that special interrogatories are distasted and should not be used, that put together I think is going to present information to the Second Circuit that -- that putting it directly in the special verdict form went too far.

And that is the government's position. The instruction is very clear. They're going to have

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the instruction. It doesn't need to be in there, because the number of different permutations that we're going to need to figure this out -- are they going to have to figure out the entrapment by estoppel defense first, or are they going to have to go through the elements of the charges, then hit entrapment by estoppel? Is there going to be language that says, well, if you still find the defendants guilty -- because now, obviously, the government has objected to the use of it. So I --I could presume maybe that if there was -- let's say, for example, they checked the box we do find the defendants guilty or that they've met all the elements, the government has met all the elements, but we also find that this entrapment by estoppel defense applies, I don't know -- I mean, I'm not an appellate attorney. I don't know if the government would be able to appeal that and reinstate the -the fact that all the elements were found. I don't know.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think it's that complicated, frankly, to set it out. And the Second Circuit in the case you cited didn't say that it was error to have included a separate inquiry of the jury. It just said that the general

verdict was okay. So -- but it had the caveat that it would be the Second Circuit's position it should be carefully considered.

You know, I'll look at the case, because, you know, I don't know. But just from your account of it, it still looked like there was an open door to having included it. But --

MR. MANGO: Just one last point. In Bell, your Honor, there was no special verdict form, so they didn't weigh on whether it was error. But they did say they weighed on whether -- because the judge sua sponte said, "You know what, I should have put this in the special verdict form." So, in a sense, they kind of did, because they went on to say the use of a general verdict form was not error of any species --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MANGO: -- and did not warrant a new trial, and went on to say that these instructions the court gave on self-defense were clear and called attention to the very issue of self-defense.

So, in essence, the Second Circuit kind of did say in that case you didn't need it.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. MANGO: Maybe. Maybe you didn't need

it.

THE COURT: The facts are different. The verdict was already rendered. You know, a lot of distinctions. But, I mean, I'll look at it carefully. I don't know, because I don't know the case, but from hearing your account, I know you can make some distinctions.

Mr. Linsin?

MR. LINSIN: Thank you, your Honor. I don't have the Bell case in front of me. I do believe, given Mr. Mango's account, that a review of this issue post-verdict when neither party apparently had requested or objected to a special verdict form prior to the matter being submitted to the jury, I think puts us in a very different posture here. We're obviously having this discussion before the matter is submitted.

We are strongly of the view that this would be -- is both required and would be very helpful to the jury for -- candidly, for the very reasons

Mr. Mango has just described. What is the jury to make of this defense and how does it apply? How should it be considered count by count for the counts that it relates to?

So we don't believe that the Bell case, at

least from what I understand, would be controlling here. We believe that without it being cumbersome, and similar in some respects, your Honor, to the manner in which the Court has addressed the need for special findings in Counts 17, 18, and 19 with respect to the penalties provisions of that statute. Those special findings are built into the form. As the Court has understood, they are required, based upon the manner in which fines could potentially be calculated.

We believe that for each of these counts, with some -- perhaps some supplemental language on the very first page of the verdict form itself, that the form could -- could easily say after the statement of the charge, if the jury unanimously concludes that the government has not proven this charge beyond a reasonable doubt, and then just direct them to what would be perhaps designated as Part C -- to this Part C that would say how do you find on Count 1 as to each defendant, quilty/not guilty. If the government hasn't proven their case, the jury would be directed to that portion of the form. If you conclude that the government has proven this charge beyond a reasonable doubt, then direct the jury to what would be Part B, and then

ask, has the defendant -- has the defendant proven the defense of entrapment estoppel with respect to this charge by a preponderance of the evidence; yes/no.

And then the flow would then direct them to

Part C. And there would need to be, I think, some

preliminary guidance as to what a "no" decision

would mean in that Part B, but I think this could

be -- the jury could be directed to how they should

make these assessments pretty simply and without

any -- without unnecessarily complicating the form,

but providing proper legal guidance to the jury as

to just what their decision process should be.

THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, that's essentially what I think would work. And I think I know how we would like to see it. I would circulate it just to have you look at it, because I think we were pretty close last night to getting it clear.

But I want to look at Bell. So I think, you know, I have the parties' positions, and I think that's -- yours included, Mr. Personius?

MR. PERSONIUS: Judge, yeah. The only thing I would note, Mr. Mango was kind enough to give us a copy of the Bell decision.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PERSONIUS: If you read further from the portion he quoted, at pages 484 through 485, the Second Circuit notes the charge that was given in Bell. And also I think Bell is different because the -- I don't know self-defense federally, but from reading this, the defense doesn't have any burden on that to prove it. It's that the government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there wasn't self-defense. I think it's different than what we have here. And I think at 484, 485 it makes that clear that there was a different consideration there.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, you know, what I'll do is I'll take a few minutes now, and, you know, we'll kind of, from a chambers standpoint, decide how we're going to proceed. I understand the respective arguments. And then just in a few minutes we'll have the jury come out.

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, the only additional point I would ask for the Court's consideration is with respect to Count 17. And as we had discussed kind of in the abstract yesterday, we do believe with respect to Count 17, and assuming we are adding in this element of finding

that there was active management, just a direction that there be a unanimity determination as to what action that -- a -- a confirmation that there has been a unanimous decision as to what action constituted active management.

MR. MANGO: And, your Honor, the government doesn't feel that is necessary. Again, the point of this verdict form is to keep it simple. Just listening from Mr. Linsin's description before of this entrapment by estoppel addition and then this addition, this — this form is not going to be something that's going to be easy for them to work through. I'd like to see the draft form, obviously, before it goes. But there's no requirement that they need to be unanimous as to what active management is.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, there are some cases, and I -- I just can't call them to mind right now, that -- where there are several options that the court does require without unanimity with respect to the jury's action on those different options. But I'm not sure that I recall anything other than a charge to the jury, rather than a statement on the form relative to that.

So I want to take a look at it from that

standpoint. I know you want it on the form, if I understand you correctly. But --

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, this is the one element in the one count, I believe, where there are a variety of different options as to the particular conduct that could be considered as active management. So that is why we think it should be particularized on this count.

Perhaps a general unanimity instruction would be sufficient, but I think -- I think it is of particular significance for this element on this count just because there has been such a wide variety of evidence as to what does and what doesn't constitute active management, and differing time frames when that conduct occurred.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I mean, it's -- I mean, frankly, I know where you're coming from. It's been a little bit troubling to me. I just -- I'll have to work out how I want to handle it. Okay?

MR. LINSIN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you for your input.

Andrew, is there anything else?

LAW CLERK: No.

1 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to target 2 10:15 to start. Okay? 3 MR. PERSONIUS: Judge, if it's helpful, 4 and I hope this isn't a problem, I went through my 5 closing this morning. I think I told you about a half an hour. It's at least an hour. 6 7 THE COURT: That's okay. 8 MR. PERSONIUS: I'm sorry. 9 THE COURT: Whatever the time is, it is. 10 Okay. I think we ran over a little bit 11 yesterday on approximations, and I just hope that 12 we don't run over the extended approximation, but 13 whatever you have to do, I mean --MR. PERSONIUS: My prediction right now, 14 15 your Honor, would be 60 to 70 minutes. 16 THE COURT: Okay. All right. And then you have rebuttal, Mr. Piaggione? 17 18 MR. PIAGGIONE: Yes, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. PIAGGIONE: And depending on what I 21 hear, it might affect the length of my rebuttal. 22 THE COURT: All right. Well, that's what 23 rebuttal is for, Mr. Piaggione. 24 MR. PIAGGIONE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

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MR. LINSIN: Thank you, your Honor.

(Short recess was taken.)

(Jury not present in the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Please have a seat.

Okay. We're reassembled, and the attorneys and parties are back present. Is there some matter relating to the proposed jury verdict form that you want to call to my attention?

MR. PERSONIUS: Yes, Judge. And thank you for coming out. I was reading further the Bell decision that the government was kind enough to provide to us, and then I've had a chance to talk to Mr. Linsin about it and, actually, Mr. Mango too.

And what the court indicated in -- the trial court indicated in the Bell decision to the jury was, actually, you might want to consider the self-defense issue first. In other words, don't do that last. Consider that first. And it caused me to wonder if here if the jury shouldn't be given the option, in terms of how they address, whether they address the beyond a reasonable doubt for the particular count first or whether they address the defense of entrapment by estoppel first, that they

shouldn't be required, necessarily, to reach a guilty verdict on a particular count before they consider the entrapment by estoppel defense.

I don't think there's any requirement.

Certainly, it wouldn't make sense that they would have to do that. And that the jury should be informed that there's no particular procedure that they have to follow in considering guilt on the count versus the entrapment by estoppel defense with respect to that count. And I just wanted to bring that to your attention that that was a thought we had.

MR. MANGO: Brief comment, your Honor. I haven't found any Second Circuit case except for George, which was cited by the defendants in their request for the additional instruction. This is the George case, 2004 Second Circuit case, in which the district court gave — this is — this is the extent of the instruction the district court gave on entrapment by estoppel: "If you believe that Mr. George was trying to comply with the law by following the instructions of the person to whom he submitted his passport application, and you believe that a reasonable person desirous of obeying the

law would have accepted those instructions as accurate, then you may not convict Mr. Gorge based on the fact that the number was not his actual Social Security number."

That's it. That's all we have from guidance from the Second Circuit. Now, obviously, your instruction goes beyond that.

THE COURT: It's pretty strong and detailed.

MR. MANGO: Yeah. And I'm concerned that now if we go to the next step and actually tell the jury how they should weigh this, this gets back to -- this is a separate Second Circuit case, which gets back to why the Second Circuit does not like special verdict forms. This is a 1958 case, United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d at 392. I don't have the first -- first page of it. But it said the court elaborated on the reasoning and indicated that special verdicts tend to infringe on certain historic functions of the jury, to temper the law with common sense, to decide whether to follow instructions, and to reach a general verdict without enunciating its reasons.

That's very important. So the more we mess with that, the more we're taking away this jury's

historic function. And that's why we would be concerned with actually telling the jury, well, you may want to look at this first and then go through everything else. And why it shouldn't be in the verdict form.

THE COURT: Well, you know, I wasn't at the Supreme Court arguments yesterday, but they seemed to be concerned about new developments, for example, in relationships. And, you know, there's been a lot of new developments in the law since 1958 and the O'Looney case, you know, which I think we have to be sensitive too. This is what, only the second criminal Clean Air Act prosecution in history. Right? So I think we've got to take that into account, and we've got to look at this carefully.

I do agree with you, though, that the charge on the estoppel by entrapment defense is a strong charge, and I think a good charge. Do we need to adjust the verdict form? I'm not sure. We're going look at it carefully. I'll look at Bell.

MR. MANGO: Thank you.

THE COURT: I think one concern is, and, I mean, is there evidence here that would -- that's been introduced by either side in this case that

would apply to all the counts but the -- but for the obstruction of justice charge? And I want to make sure that there's an argument to be made that there is before we consider that entry on the special verdict form.

Mr. Mango?

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MR. MANGO: Right. That's very much why we raised the issue yesterday and again quickly this morning, your Honor. Because -- because these are issues that are -- if it goes a certain way, may be, you know, under the microscope in the Second Circuit. And this is an expansion, in the government's view, of the entrapment by estoppel defense. There's no case law out there, in the Second Circuit, certainly, that says -- and think about it in the environmental context, that the precedence this case is going to set is that in every -- in every environmental case you have -you have a duty on government, either local, state, or federal, to go out and do inspections. And by the fact that they now missed it over, you know, 20 years, 30, however many years you want to talk about, even five years, one year, if it's multiple inspections, this case is now going to stand for the precedence that in any environmental case

there's this entrapment by estoppel --

THE COURT: Well, I mean, that's factually distinguishable. I mean, you have some pretty aggravated circumstances here in terms of a long-standing situation where you don't catch certain violations or, you know, allegedly certain violations, and there was a lot that was going on that was known by the DEC people and that didn't become known to the EPA people, I think is what the defense is going to argue.

So I want to balance that. I've got to take a close look at it. I don't agree that this necessarily is bad precedent, but I just want to make sure that it's the right thing to do under the circumstances.

MR. MANGO: I'm not saying bad precedent, your Honor. I'm just going to say it expands the entrapment by estoppel. But, for example, say in Count 17, the storage count, there's been no evidence that DEC -- and it's the defendants' burden -- that there's been no evidence that in 1998 DEC was told about this, the storage of the D018 on the ground. There's nothing. There is nothing in the 30 days of trial we have. And so it's not warranted with that count.

THE COURT: What was the date of that storage?

MR. MANGO: 1998 it starts. That's the day we, which we didn't get into it, that the deer got covered in coke breeze and the -- you know, there's no indication that defendant ever said, hey, we've got these tanks --

THE COURT: But they were on premises after 1998.

MR. MANGO: Not in that area. There's no evidence they were in that area though. We've got a 188-acre site. And they were there in 2009.

I'll grant that. And they saw it in 2009, sure.

But starting in 1998, no.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I mean, that's part of my concern, so I've got to look at that carefully.

MR. LINSIN: Well, your Honor, as to that particular point, there clearly is evidence that they were on-site repeatedly after 1998. If, as Mr. Mango says, the evidence isn't there to show that we've established the necessary elements for this defense, then the jury will make quick work of it. Then that's a simple matter, and there's no prejudice to the government. But the evidence

certainly is there, and I -- that -- that the DEC officials were on this site repeatedly after that date. Clearly in 19 -- 2009 there were explicit discussions about the materials in this area.

And the point I wanted to add to what

Mr. Personius raised, and what I was thinking about
as he was discussing this Bell matter, is this,
your Honor. None of us, I believe, want to see an
unnecessary retrial of this case. What I became
concerned about as I was reflecting on this is,
if -- if we have jurors -- if for some reason the
jury is not able to reach a unanimous verdict with
respect to a given count, they shouldn't be told
they have to stop there. The jury should be able
to consider this defense with respect to that
count, regardless of whether they have reached a
unanimous guilty/not guilty verdict on that count.

And that is the point I think is important. It hadn't been captured as I reflected on this special verdict form, and what I think the Court's instruction should guide them that they are permitted to consider the defense even if they haven't reached an unanimous verdict. I would hate to see a special verdict form that requires unanimity on a not guilty or guilty and prevents

them then from considering the defense, so we wind up with a hung jury that hasn't even considered the defense. And I think we have to be sensitive to that as we are considering the guidance to give to the jury.

THE COURT: All right. Well, you know, it seems to me that we really have an engaged jury.

And I can't imagine a case where the jury would be any more engaged than this jury appears to be, okay, from my observations. And the crux of the questions that have been asked, essentially, is give us a little assistance, give us a little help. And I don't think, frankly, the Second Circuit can be critical of attempts to do that. But we have to be right.

Like, for example, what you were just referring to, Mr. Mango. I'm not sure being on-site is sufficient for purposes of the entrapment defense without there being disclosure associated with that. So, you know, I'm not sure it would be proper to include a reference to the entrapment defense if there is an absence of evidence with respect to disclosure.

MR. LINSIN: But, your Honor, the count runs for an extended number of years.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. LINSIN: And disclosure during any portion of that count, I believe, would -- would trigger the applicability of the defense. It is not -- it is not required that -- you know, this isn't a year-by-year count as some of these other counts are. This is '98 to 2009. And our point is that this -- that we have multiple visits on-site during that period of time, and then we have an explicit discussion and engagement of the regulators down by those tanks in 2009 as to what's going to be done with this material. And so we certainly have notice during the time period that is alleged in the count.

And so we think that that satisfies the requirements -- the threshold requirements of at least raising the defense and then leaving it to the jury to make a factual determination as to whether we satisfied the elements.

THE COURT: And maybe it does. But that's certainly at the tail end of the ten-year period, if you will.

MR. LINSIN: Well, the specific visit to the tanks is, your Honor. The other visits to the site come, as the Court will recall, at a number of

different intervals.

THE COURT: But that's what I -- I don't think that's enough. Site visits, absent presence at the tanks, big distinction, in my mind, at least, at this point. I mean, I --

MR. LINSIN: Well, your Honor, it is a distinction, but the truth is, the evidence before the jury is that we have RCRA compliance inspectors at the facility for multiple hours on a number of different occasions. And I think -- I don't think it's fair to the jury to just cut off what may be reasonable inferences from that information derived from the inspection reports and the understanding as to what these RCRA inspectors are charged with doing when they go out to these facilities. There may well be reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that direct evidence.

MR. MANGO: Real brief, your Honor?

THE COURT: Just give me one second so I can try to straighten this out.

Yeah, but interjecting reasonable inferences upon inferences to get to the kind of defense that's being urged or argued here, I mean, frankly, is a cause for concern for me. I mean, because there is no direct evidence. And maybe the DEC

people should have been out there, you know, looking at, you know, the different areas that we have no evidence about. But -- but we don't have any evidence that they were there. And to say that that's sufficient to trigger a consideration of the entrapment defense, I'm not yet convinced.

Let me hear what you have to say.

MR. MANGO: Your Honor, it was picking up on that point, that this -- this is such a serious defense. It's -- the impact of it is so monumental. I mean, it's discussed in the Second Circuit case law that it can't be based on reasonable inferences. It's got to be based on that disclosure at the time or before of the authorization by the government. It's very clear. You've spelled it out very clearly in your instruction. You can't -- you can't have inferences as part of this. And I think that is captured in the language that the Second Circuit uses as to how sparingly this defense should be used and such.

THE COURT: Yeah. But my concern, too,
is, this is a very unique type of case. These kind
of administrative criminal prosecutions are
different, and we have to consider that. I mean,

it's not an attempt murder case. It's just not.

All right. And that's why this kind of precedent

can be positive precedent, but I'm not even worried

about the precedential part of it. I want it to be

right so this jury does what's right for both sides

of this case. And that's why there's so much at

stake here, okay.

But I appreciate the input, and we'll work it out.

Okay. Andrew, is there anything else that we should touch base with?

LAW CLERK: No, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. I think we'll leave it at that. I think we're ready to start with the jury, if you would, Chris, please. Thank you.

(Jury seated.)

THE COURT: Good morning. Have a seat please. What did I tell you, we would start promptly at 10:30. I said not a minute later, maybe two minutes. Right, didn't I tell you that? Okay.

All right. Good to see you. And I hope you're ready. We have two more closing arguments, okay?

And we're going start with Mr. Personius.

And the attorneys and parties are back, present. As you know, you can use the notebooks, but very important that you focus on the fact that whatever you put down now is not evidence. That's just simply a guide, if you choose to use the books at all, and make sure that's clear in your notes.

Again, please don't prejudge the case. You still have more to hear. You still have to get -- and all the attorneys have referenced what I'm going to be giving you in my charge, so we're going to take some time and we're going to work through that. And then you have to go about applying that law, working through the counts, following the form that I give you with respect to how you consider the evidence in light of the count. I'll be telling you different things as I define terms for you a little bit later, and I'll tell you more about the charge at that time too.

But you look ready. I mean, I haven't seen you look this ready in I don't know how long. So thank you for your attention. You know, you've been really terrific, and, you know, yesterday was a relatively long day in terms of taking in everything that the attorneys had for you yesterday. But again, we thank you for your

engagement. You've been terrific. Please bear us. We've got two more arguments.

The attorneys and parties are back, present.

You are here, roll call waived. And I think we're

now, Mr. Personius, waiting for your closing

argument.

MR. PERSONIUS: Thank you, Judge. May it please the Court --

THE COURT: Yes, you may proceed.

MR. PERSONIUS: -- Mr. Mango,

Mr. Piaggione, Mr. Linsin, Miss Grasso, good morning members of the jury.

Over the next -- it will be about an hour or so, two TV shows, that I'm going talk to you. And I want to you talk to you about four things. You want to hear about the obstruction count, I know you do, so that's the first thing I'm going to talk to you about. There's been an effort, in my judgment, through this case by the government to, for lack of a better term, throw dirt on Mark Kamholz. I've identified a dozen instances where that attempt was made. I feel obliged to address each of those, because I think it's important in terms of what you think about Mr. Kamholz as you go to deliberate. I think it's also important in

terms of assessing the quality of the evidence that the government has given to you and the arguments that the government is making about that evidence.

Because as the Judge has told you repeatedly and you know this, this is a very, very important matter. This isn't some law school hypothetical where you can pick and choose what you want from the evidence and ignore the rest of it. You've got to look at the whole body of the evidence, and as the Judge says, apply your common sense and your experience and your intelligence to that evidence.

The third point that I'm going to address with you is this entrapment by estoppel defense, because it says an awful lot about the way we approach -- Mr. Linsin and I and Miss Grasso, how we approached this case has a lot to do with that defense. I want to make absolutely certain you understand what that theory is.

The last thing I'm going to do is to go through just a few examples of the evidence that the government has presented, and the point being that you've been told by the Judge what reasonable doubt means. And in essence what it means is it has to be of such quality -- the evidence has to be of such quality that you wouldn't hesitate to rely

upon that evidence in an important matter. In simple terms, that's what it is. And my point is with the evidence you're getting from the government you most surely in an important matter would hesitate to act.

So let's get to the obstruction, and then we'll move through these other points, and then I'll sit down. But I'm not going to be as brief as I was during my opening.

Okay. If anybody ever came to any of us and they were upset about something that somebody had said, you would never ever, ever, ever, even in some casual setting, you would never make a judgment on that person or what that person intended without asking questions. And the kind of questions you would ask is well, when the person made that comment, what were the surrounding circumstances? What had you been talking about before that? What did you talk about after that? And if it had to do with some action you took based on what that person said, you'd want to know what happened after that.

You'll remember that when I was questioning

Mr. Cahill, who is the critical witness, of course,

on this, that in a fashion I asked him do you agree

that actions speak louder than words. And in considering the obstruction count, the point I'm getting to is you cannot take in isolation whether it's six words or nine words or whatever it is that Mr. Kamholz said to Mr. Cahill back on what we understand was April 10th, 2009, in the by-products area and ignore everything else that surrounds that.

You have to consider the entire context of what was said, and you have to go back, I want to suggest historically, to get an understanding of what Mr. Kamholz's understanding was at the time he walked through the by-products area back in April of 2009.

Now, you've heard from the evidence that

Mr. Kamholz has been working at Tonawanda Coke for

about 30 years, and for that whole period of time

he's been the environmental compliance officer.

We've heard from the evidence that -- and you can

see it in the overhead photograph -- it's a big

place. It's about 150 or more acres. It's a large

facility. It occupies a lot of land. You saw from

the photographs where his office is, Kamholz's

office is, versus where the main part of the

operation is.

It's a distance, and what you heard from Mr.

Foersch is if -- you heard this from Mr. Carlacci
too, if you're in the office area, you don't walk
over to that other part of the plant. You drive
over there. And this isn't to suggest that
Mr. Kamholz wasn't in and around the plant.
Obviously he was. But one of the questions is with
what frequency?

And if you'll recall, at least what I recall from the evidence is that what Mr. Cahill testified to is that during the 15 or so years that he worked in the by-products area, both as an operator and a foreman, he would see Mr. Kamholz in the by-products area. At one point he said -- initially he said once a month. Then he said once every three months to take a test. That's what Mr. Cahill testified to.

So just because -- this is one of the dangers in a trial like this is that you take 30 years of a person's work experience, 30 years of activity at a coking plant, and you compress that into four weeks. And in that four weeks you talk about isolated components of that facility's operation, this pressure relief valve, the two quench towers, and whether or not they had baffles, and they did

not have baffles. We know that. This coal tar sludge from the openings, the decanter tar sludge, what happened with that, and then these two abandoned tanks.

We've taken four or five components of this huge operation, we focused on those over the four weeks, and do not slip, do not slip into thinking well that's all Mark Kamholz had to worry about day in and day out. Recall that this plant has to run 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 12 months a year, 365. It's running all the time. If you don't do that, apparently these ovens fall apart. So it's running all the time.

Mark Kamholz doesn't work 24 hours a day or seven days a week or anything like that. He's a regular shift employee who works an eight-hour day, five days a week. But guess what? The environmental issues at Tonawanda Coke don't just arise when he's working. They arise all day long. And he's there for just a fraction of the time to deal with all of these issues, and not just with what's going on with the quench towers, or what's going on with the PRV, or what's going on in the by-products area.

So what he knows about any particular operation

you cannot assume he knew anything and everything that was going on in by-products, especially when you know from Mr. Cahill, what I recall, is that he would only come -- Mr. Kamholz would only come to by-products once every one or once every three months.

So, in addition to that, this is a coke plant. It's an old coke plant. We've seen pictures. It's close to a hundred years old. This thing has been around. And being a coke plant -- Mr. Sitzman made a comment. He said it has coke smells. He's been around coke plants. He knows what a coke plant is. It's not a place that you want to take your kids to play. It's a coke plant.

And the nature of the operation is that it's going to have issues. It's going to have a lot more issues than some other type of manufacturing operation is. By definition, it's going to have issues. And who is in charge of dealing with all of those issues? It's Mr. Kamholz.

So, it's against that backdrop that I ask you to consider this obstruction charge. And then in addition to that, recall that Mr. Foersch, whom we called as a witness because we felt it was important. Who was the 30-year face of the

Department of Environmental Conservation at

Tonawanda Coke? It was Gary Foersch. Who called
him to testify? The defense called Mr. Foersch to
testify. That in itself speaks volumes about the
government's case.

But what you heard from Mr. Foersch was that his focus while working at Tonawanda Coke was on the ovens. The ovens is where you get all these emissions. They're coming out the doors and the lids. That's where the real concern is. It would make sense, and I think the evidence would support the fact that that's where Mr. Kamholz's principle concern would be also.

So, in any event, the reason I point all that out is it would be unfair to Mr. Kamholz, it would be inconsistent with the evidence to assume that he knew anything and everything about the whole plant and what was going on, much less anything and everything about what was going on in by-products.

So he gets a letter from Miss Hamre,

April 8th I think it was, that said -- maybe a

phone call too -- says we're coming out to do an

inspection. And we're concerned about emissions,

so we're going to focus on the by-products area.

He gathers some documents together that she's asked

for, and he does what I think you would expect he would do, which is he goes to the by-products area and he tells Mr. Cahill, who is the foreman of the by-products area, who's been working there for 15 years, had been the foreman for six -- I don't know, six or seven years at that point in time. And he says we're going to have an inspection. Some people from the EPA are coming in, and let's take a look at the by-products area.

Now, let me step back for a minute too because this was suggested. It was suggested that Mr. Kamholz somehow had a concern about emissions because there had been this visit a year earlier. There was a visit May 28th of 2008. Mr. Carlacci came with Mr. Sitzman and Miss Webster, and Mr. Foersch was there too. And it was a visit, not an inspection, and they talked about emissions and the concerns that they had. And I think there's some suggestion that Mr. Kamholz had in the back of his mind that he was worried about emissions and the fact that the DEC was looking at the emissions.

Well, Mr. Kamholz knew from back in August of 2007 that there were emission concerns at Tonawanda Coke. There had been an inspection back in August of 2007 by Mr. Sitzman and Miss Webster

and Mr. Foersch that dealt with emissions. And there's no evidence whatsoever in the record that Mr. Kamholz did anything untoward after learning about that. And in fact, when this group came back along with Mr. Carlacci on May 28th of 2008, they told him at that time we have continuous monitoring, continuous monitoring going on at Tonawanda Coke.

So Mr. Kamholz knew that a year before this
April 2009 inspection that DEC was continuously
monitoring Tonawanda Coke for its emissions. And
is there any evidence he did anything untoward in
those next 11 months? No, there isn't. So that
has nothing to do with Mr. Kamholz going to look at
by-products and talking to Mr. Cahill on what I
believe it's been testified was probably that
preceding Friday, which would have been April 10th
of 2009.

And when he went there, he didn't focus on this pressure relief valve. He went there to talk to him about a variety of different concerns that he had, and Mr. Cahill testified about those. He was concerned about the moat and the condition of the moat.

And you remember from the testimony of Miss

Hamre -- I think you saw pictures -- that moat was not in very good shape. It had objects sitting in it. I think there were pallets sitting in the moat and that type of thing. He told Mr. Cahill to clean it up. If he did, he didn't do a very good job because those items were still there during the inspection.

He talked to him about the drip legs, and he said those valves can't be open. Those valves have to be closed, which was the proper way that the valves should be handled. He talked to him about some stray pumps that were lying around in the by-products area. He said clean those up, Pat.

And he also talked to him about the AC building, and the condition of the AC building.

And during the course of that walk-through that valve went off. And Mr. Kamholz said something about the valve and something about the valve going off during the inspection. What exactly he said we don't know for sure. Mr. Cahill on the witness stand was quite confident as to what he had said.

"We can't have that going off while they're here."

What he testified to in the grand jury was not the same. He testified four different ways about what was said by Mr. Kamholz during this

walk-through. But if we get hung up and we focus too much on what Mr. Kamholz said, and we don't look at what happened after that, we're missing the forest through the trees, because you've got to look at what happens after that.

And what do we know from the testimony happened after that regarding Mr. Kamholz and Mr. Cahill?

And what's the answer to that question? Zero.

Nothing. No further discussion for the rest of history about the pressure relief valve. That's what Mr. Cahill's testimony was.

I went through it with him in great detail.

First question, after you had that conversation and before the inspection which started the following Tuesday, whenever the meeting was. Cahill says it was Friday. Say it was Friday, Saturday, Sunday, Monday Mr. Kamholz come and talk to you about that valve? No. There was no discussion at all.

The inspection starts. Mr. Kamholz come to you and say did you do anything to take care of that valve so it doesn't come up? Nope. Never discussed. Never discussed again. Mr. Cahill says, well, I would raise it up in the morning and I lowered that set point down at night. And did Mr. Kamholz have any idea at all that you did that?

No. He doesn't record it in the log book. Does Mr. Kamholz know you didn't record it in the log book? No.

Then on that Friday, April the 17th, lo and behold, if it hadn't gone off before then, and it's not clear whether it had or had not, as much as it was supposed to be going off, I don't know. That Friday it goes off and if gets noticed. Any discussion at all with Mr. Kamholz after that?

Pat, you didn't do a very good job. Pat, what did you do? Pat, look what you've caused. It is not discussed again.

After that you continue, Mr. Cahill, to work at Tonawanda Coke. What was your relationship with Mr. Kamholz? We had a good relationship. Did it change at all after that inspection? Did it change at all after the PRV was discovered? No. No. We continued to have a good relationship. Mr. Cahill, you became the superintendent or the plant manager, whatever it's called, plant — the head for the whole deal. And from time to time Mr. Kamholz would prepare forms for you to complete. Yeah. Did you have any hesitation to complete those forms based on this prior incident or anything else? No. No. I have no hesitation at all. You relied on

Mark and had confidence in him? Yes, I did. Yes, I did.

On the day that the valve goes off, which was that Friday April the 17th, what happens? The valve goes off, one of the inspectors — we don't know who it was — one of the inspectors notices it, and he says, "What was that"? And Mr. Kamholz's response was either steam or is it steam? And then the inspector — one of the inspectors said, "What is it?" Mr. Kamholz, immediately without missing a beat said, "It's a pressure relief valve." The next question was, "Well, how long has it been here?" Mr. Kamholz says, "I don't know. Pat, how long has it been here?" And Pat says, "I don't know."

You sat through this trial. Does anybody know how long that valve has been there? Was Mr.

Kamholz lying when he said he thought it was steam? You remember the testimony of Mr. Cahill when he testified in the grand jury, not here. When he testified in the grand jury, prior sworn statement. You can weigh that in deciding what the truth is.

In the grand jury Mr. Cahill testified when that thing went off I didn't know whether it was steam or coke oven gas, that's what he said in the

grand jury. Here he said he was shocked because

Mr. Kamholz thought it might be steam. It's not

what he said in the grand jury. Why the change? I

don't know. But that was his grand jury testimony.

Could you put up Government Exhibit 50, Lauren?

I hope that's right.

This is the picture that shows something coming out of that pressure relief valve. Mr. Cahill was asked about that during his trial testimony. And he was asked -- I think it was by Mr. Mango -- "What is that coming out of that -- out of that valve?" His answer, "I don't know." He didn't say it was coke oven gas. Even in the picture,

Government Exhibit 50, which shows something coming out of the valve, Mr. Cahill's trial testimony was "I don't know", and it was truthful, because you don't know. It didn't always emit coke oven gas. It had a steam line on it and sometimes it emitted steam.

So for Mr. Kamholz in response to the question "What was that?" to say, "Steam" or "Is it steam?" was an entirely, entirely truthful response. His immediate response when asked, "What is it?" to say, "It's the pressure relief valve" was an entirely truthful response. His response to the

question, "How long has it been here?" To say, "I don't know," Pat, you're the foreman for by-products. You've been here for 15 straight years — he didn't say that, but as you know, Pat, I only come here once every month or three months. How long has it been here, Pat? Was there something wrong with him asking Cahill to give his response on that, and then what happened?

Mr. Cahill took a couple of the inspectors to the little green shack where this set recorder is, and provided them with truthful information on how the shack operates. There's no suggestion that anything Mr. Cahill said was wrong or inaccurate. There is no suggestion Mr. Kamholz exercised any control over what Mr. Cahill said.

Then the following Monday, which would be April the 20th, and the following Tuesday, which would be April the 21st, there were additional questions asked of Mr. Kamholz and Mr. Cahill regarding the pressure relief valve. Truthful responses were provided to those questions. There is no suggestion Mark Kamholz exercised any improper control over the information provided by Mr. Cahill or that the information provided by Mr. Kamholz was anything other than truthful.

So where is the obstruction? If you look at entire context of this circumstance, where is the -- where is the wrongdoing? What was done here that was that was wrong? So then the question is, well, why would you refer questions about by-products to Mr. Cahill? Why wouldn't you answer those yourself? Why wouldn't you refer questions about by-products to Mr. Cahill? He's the one that works there. He's the one that's in day in and day out. He's the one that's been there for 15 years.

Other questions regarding by-products were referred to Mr. Cahill during the inspection. Was there something wrong with that? If you remember the evidence, Mr. Cahill remembered that he was asked about the moat, the tar precipitator pump, the light oil system, the drip legs, and the ammonia stripper among other questions that he answered during the inspection.

It was in Martha Hamre's log, this daily log that she kept, about her references to ask Pat, or talked to -- to the foreman of by-products. So, having him answer questions about the PRV, there was nothing wronging with that. Mr. Cahill testified he wasn't happy about that. He felt as though he had been put on the spot, and just to

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bring this back, the Batman objection by Mr. Mango, and we got a laugh out of that, but the question had been asked was with great power comes great responsibility. And the point of me asking that was not to -- not to get a laugh out of the jury, but the point is -- the point is this, if you're going to be the foreman of a department, if you're going to take the extra money you get to be the foreman, if you're going to enjoy the extra benefits when you are the boss of a department, you're going to get upset during an important inspection when you're asked to answer questions about how that department operates? It just doesn't make sense, and it certainly isn't fair to put some responsibility on Mr. Kamholz because Mr. Cahill didn't like being put on the spot.

And what do we know about Mr. Cahill? What we know about him is that, as I told you, Tonawanda Coke is a community just like any other community, just like you are a community. And we all react differently to different situations.

There was a time many years ago when I started doing this where I hated doing what I'm doing right now, standing up like this, I was sweating bullets and my knees were knocking. I wasn't comfortable

doing it at all. I've been doing it a long time.

It's okay. I don't mind doing it. We all have things we like to do and we don't like to do. And Mr. Cahill said he doesn't like to be the center of attention. That's okay. That's understandable. He said that. He doesn't like being put on the spot. You could tell I think when he was on the witness stand, he wasn't comfortable. Remember when he was asked to look for some circular charts and Martha Hamre noticed he was nervous? That's his personality.

But to infer from that because he didn't like being asked questions about his department, that that means this man is a criminal or engaged in obstructive behavior, it just doesn't follow. And there is a couple upside down perversions about this whole thing that I don't know what weight they should carry in your deliberations. But it's turning the world on its ear, which is a lot of that in this case.

But what is the principle complaint about what happened? The allegation is I guess that

Mr. Kamholz said whatever he said on April the

10th, and that caused Mr. Cahill to raise the set point on the PRV. After the EPA and the DEC find

out about the PRV, what do they tell Mr. Cahill and Mr. Kamholz to do? Turn up the set point on the PRV.

And what else seems unusual about this and doesn't really make a lot of sense, what's the other complaint? The other complaint is apparently that it was -- it was significant that Mr. Cahill when he would do what he did, on his own, wouldn't record it in this by-product operators log book. That he was doing what he did, and he claimed the reason was because he didn't want anybody to know what he was doing.

Well, we know from the evidence both from his testimony and from these by-product operator log books and the testimony of Mr. Conway, Mr. Cahill never ever put any of his change in the set point entries in the log book. There are none. So, is there a reasonable doubt? Is there more than a reasonable doubt? Would you hesitate to act on this evidence in a matter of importance? I don't think there's any question but that you would.

Now, the government, and they're certainly entitled to do this, but what they do is they try to -- to dirty up Mark Kamholz. This obstruction allegation, I can tell from how you reacted to when

this evidence comes in, I can tell how you reacted when Mr. Linsin closed yesterday and said, "I'm going to have Mr. Personius talk about that", that you were looking to me because you wanted to hear about this. I understand this is important to you, and it well should be. It's also important to Mark Kamholz, and it's important to his family how this case gets decided. And the government, quite rightly, says if we can throw some dirt on Kamholz, it's going to help. You know, we got to try to do that, so that's what they tried to do in this case.

He's been referred to as being manipulative and deceitful. That's how he's been described by the government. Again, lets put this in context.

We're going to part two of my four-part presentation. So you're through the first quarter.

Remember what you've heard from the evidence, the government went to Tonawanda Coke on December 17th, 2009. And Mr. O'Connor, who testified -- he's in the front row there -- he was there. They took a bunch of the agents out there. They conducted what's called a federal raid. The whole point of doing that is to catch the target off guard, to get the smoking-gun evidence that shows the criminality. They're a lot of work. So

the reason you do that, rather than issue a subpoena is -- it's like a Pearl Harbor surprise attack type move. Get it before they could get rid of it or change it.

They were there for 12 hours. That's a long time. There were a lot of agents there. They seized 36 large boxes of documents. Thirty-six boxes of documents. And what do we have in this case is the evidence that they got out of that seizure. What's been offered in evidence here that's the smoking gun evidence, the evidence that Mark Kamholz is a monster? Some of his handwritten notes from the inspection where he says something about got Pat Cahill on April 20th to talk about the PRV. That's bad? You got the foreman of by-products to talk to the inspectors about the PRV. That's incriminating?

The draft of his response to the request for information letter that Mr. Kamholz submitted to the EAP in October of 2009, there's something wrong with that draft? There is a crossed-out word in there. Mr. Mango has invited you to speculate on what that crossed out word is. I mean, where are we going with this case? Where's the smoking gun that came out of the 12 hours and the 36 boxes of

evidence that was seized? So keep that in mind.

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The criminal investigation then went on for about ten months. We know it started in October of 2009. We know the indictment was returned in July of 2009, so that's about ten months. And we know that during that period of time Mr. Conway was working on it, Mr. O'Connor was working on it, and a whole bunch of other agents and investigators were working on it too. We know they had the benefit of the grand jury. We know witnesses testified in the grand jury. It's a big deal. It's a lot of power. You can subpoena somebody. You can force them to come in, you can put them under oath in front of a grand jury and ask them all the questions you want about the case. And the government, we know from the evidence, we know they took full advantage of that. They had an unbridled opportunity, unbridled opportunity to get all the evidence they wanted on Tonawanda Coke and on Mark Kamholz.

They put Mr. Kamholz and his conduct under a 30-year microscope over that ten-month period. And what do we have that shows that he's this deceitful person, this monster that Mr. Kamholz [sic] has characterized him as being? I want to, if I can,

I'm going to go through that with you in a minute.

What we know from the trial evidence is that there's a gentleman that worked in by-products back in the '90s. His name is Keith Hutchinson. You can look up there and see him. I don't think you'll remember him. He was pretty quick, but what he said about Mark Kamholz was not insignificant. And the only reason we were able to get this out is he happened to say it to the investigator, so we knew about it.

He described Mark Kamholz as being a straight shooter. He described Mark Kamholz as being very strict on environmental compliance. That's what Mr. Hutchinson said about Mark. Now getting into this a little later.

Contrast that, if you will, with -- remember Mr. Carlacci? He was the first witness. He was up here for three days when we thought this was going to be a six-month trial. It took us three days to get through the first witness. We speeded it up after that fortunately for all of us.

Mr. Carlacci, if you recall, at the tail end of his direct testimony -- he was put on as an expert. But by the end of it he was an advocate. He was an advocate to paint Mark Kamholz as a bad person.

Remember he talked about the May 28, 2008, inspection, and he accused Mr. Kamholz of having a mask. And he put the mask on over his face when he walked through by-products. And he accused Mr. Kamholz of being uncooperative, uncooperative during that visit.

Well, we were able to put into evidence his notes. What was it, three lines at the top, three lines at the bottom, notes that he had from what he described at that visit. And nothing in there, nothing in there about any of this. And there are other people that were present for that visit too, Cheryl Webster, Larry Sitzman, and Mr. Foersch was there too. Nothing, nothing about any improper behavior at this visit from Mr. Foersch. In fact, he said, no, I didn't notice anything at all. I didn't notice anything at all — anything different about Mark during that visit. No, it was typical Mark.

And then as far as the mask was concerned,

Mr. Foersch, said, Mark -- that wasn't uncommon for

Mark to have a mask around his neck. When you go

to the battery, you have to wear a mask. It

doesn't matter who you are. If you're Mark Kamholz

or you're Donald Crane or you're Mr. Saffrin, you

wear a mask in the battery area, not for gas emissions, but for particulate emissions. And that's what Mr. Foersch said.

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So, for the first of these instances of misconduct that we have, that's -- that's what you have in the evidence. You have Mr. Carlacci, the expert, being the advocate, not supported by his notes versus the other evidence in the case, which demonstrates that what Mr. Carlacci was saying did happen did not happen. Mark was not uncooperative during that inspection. And as Mr. Carlacci suggested, he wanted him -- if you remember, he wanted him to be the plant manager. We had to correct that on cross and say he's not the plant manager. He's the environmental compliance officer for the company. And the mask, I think it's clear, Mark would have a mask around his neck because of the battery, and it had nothing to do with the by-products area. That's one of these 12 instances where Mark has been painted as a bad person.

A lot has been said about the letter that was sent to Mr. Kamholz in September of 2009 by Mr. Patel. Remember that when they had the inspection in April, you had Miss Hamre and another gentlemen from Denver, the NEIC. You had from

Region 2 in New York City Mr. Patel and two other gentlemen, and you had some folks there from the DEC. And Mr. Patel testified that the EPA decided after the inspection they would send a couple of these request letters. They're called 114 letters asking for information to -- to Mr. Kamholz. They sent one in July and they sent this other one in September. And the one that's really been the focal point in terms of Mark being a bad person was the one that was sent in September.

Again, you have to put in perspective what Mr. Patel knew and what Mark knew when that letter was sent and when the response was received. And what do we know about Mr. Patel? He was present for the first week, but because of funding, he was not present for the second week. He left on that Friday, along with the other two gentlemen who came with him and went back to New York City. When was the information provided about the pressure relief valve? The next Monday and Tuesday, the 20th and 21st, when Mr. Patel and the other two, who wrote this letter from Region 2 when they weren't there. They were gone.

And -- pardon me -- what was talked about during -- on the 20th and 291st? There was talk on

both dates about the pressure relief valve and how it worked and all the details of it, and so on, and so forth. So, when Mr. Kamholz gets the letter in September, he's got it in his head that DEC and EPA know about the history of the pressure relief valve because it's been discussed. Mr. Patel and the other two gentlemen with him who wrote the letter, they don't know that, because they weren't there.

So the letter gets written to Mr. Kamholz. And one of the questions — and I think the only one that we really have to focus on is question 20F, but before we get to that, remember also that on his direct examination what Mr. Patel suggested to you was that the whole letter as is related to the PRV was misleading because he was seeking five years of information.

And when I asked him on cross, your testimony was you expected to get five years of historical information on the PRV, what did you base that on? And if you recall -- if I recall his testimony he said, well, it's in the instructions. So we went to the instruction sheet and he looked through it and he looked up and he said it's not there. And it wasn't there. And what you have to do with that letter -- I don't think I'm going to take the time

to put it up. But I encourage you, if this is a matter of concern to you, I encourage each of you to go look at that letter. It's Government Exhibit 126. The way the letter is set out is if Mr. Patel wanted information going back five years, he asked for it. And there's a specific example. There's two examples where he asked for five-year-old information. He would say I want information going back five years. He didn't say that with the pressure relief valve.

Where he does say it is there's a question about benzene service, and it's question number 16, and you're not going to remember this, but you're hopefully going to remember that Personius told me this, 16, Sweet 16, look at number 16, that's where Mr. Patel specifically asked for information going back five years.

If you look at the questions related to the pressure relief valve, which are questions at 20, and 20F comes the closest, but if you look at those questions, they don't go back five years, and Mr. Kamholz at the time he fills this out, he has in his head I've already told them back on April 20, 21st about the PRV. They're looking for what the current information is, not the historical

information.

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Question 20F is the difficult one, because if you look at the question, it's split. It asks for current information and old records depending on what the answer is. But in terms of the information request, it's current. You only provide records if the current information requires you to look back the five years.

In addition to that, we know from the evidence that Mr. Kamholz included a cover letter, and I asked Mr. Patel about that. Did you read the cover letter? Yes, I did. What did the cover letter say? If you have any questions at all about my responses, call me. So I asked Mr. Patel, did you pick up the phone and call Mr. Kamholz if you were unsatisfied or dissatisfied with what he said about anything including the PRV? And his answer was no. I don't know even -- I guess I must have asked him this, why not? And he said because I talked to my supervisor, and he said I can't call him. And the reason he couldn't call him was because the criminal investigation was pending. I mean, is that fair? I mean, you answer questions in good The person who writes the question from the EPA wants to ask a question about it, and he's told

by his supervisor, no, you can't call him because there is a criminal investigation pending. Is that fair? Does that make him a deceitful person? Look at the letter if it's of concern to you.

You can kind of get a sense when you're sitting over there when things resonated. Cahill resonated with you, and when Patel testified about this I think it resonated with you. We'll meet it head on, and I'll look every one of you in the eye and neither one of these is a concern. You'll have to remember the Cahill testimony and take into consideration everything that I've told you about the circumstances, and you'll make that decision. On the letter, you can go look at it. And I invite you to do that, because it's very clear when Mr. Patel wanted old information and when he did not.

Miss Hamre, something else that came up
yesterday in Mr. Mango's closing. This is number
three, three out of 12. We're getting there. She
testified that oh, by the way, during the opening
day of the inspection on April the 14th, that
Tuesday, Mr. Kamholz said there was no pressure
relief valve anywhere in the facility. Wow. But
on cross-examination by Mr. Linsin it became clear

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that if you looked at her notes in context that what she was talking about was the battery flare when she wrote that note. It didn't have to do with the whole facility, much less with the by-products area.

And would Mr. Kamholz say that anyway when he made prior disclosure to the DEC that talked about pressure relief valves? This isn't the only pressure relief valve at Tonawanda Coke. There is a number of pressure relief valves there. And this is probably the most important point on the fact that she is mistaken in her recall. There were other people present for that initial session. There were people present who testified here in the court that were present. I think Mr. Sitzman was there. I think Mr. Patel was there. And do you think that if they understood that Mr. Kamholz had made that representation, that the government wouldn't have asked them about that during their testimony? Do you think if others who were present who weren't called remember or understood that that's what Mr. Kamholz had said that they wouldn't have been called as witnesses here? Of course, they would have.

And the fact of the matter is it didn't happen.

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And do you think that if it was understood that Mr. Kamholz on April 14th had said there's no pressure relief valve on the coke oven gas line, which is what she suggested by her testimony and what the government argued in their closing, do you think for a minute that when that valve got discovered that that wouldn't have been brought up, that that wouldn't have been in somebody's notes again, that that wouldn't have been a topic of discussion? He said that on a Tuesday, and they find out on a Friday, and nobody talks about it? It just doesn't comport with what the Judge told you to use which is your common sense and your intelligence and your experience. Things don't happen that way. So her testimony on that she was mistaken.

Mr. Foersch testified, not on my examination but on Mr. Piaggione's cross-examination, that after he -- the last time he looked in quench tower number 2 and saw that either there were no baffles or that it was in disrepair, that he never went back there. There's no question about that. But he claimed in response to a question by Mr. Piaggione that a year later he asked Mark Kamholz, "Did you put those baffles in quench tower

number 2"? And he testified under oath that

Mr. Kamholz said, "Oh, yeah, I put them in there."

And I suggest to you that that conversation did not happen. And this would be the fourth badge of fraud, if you will, that the government relies upon.

If you'll remember Mr. Foersch had been interviewed right after Mark was arrested. Mark was arrested on December 23rd of 2009, two days before Christmas.

MR. MANGO: Your Honor, I have to object to that. There's no evidence in the record about an arrest on a specific date.

THE COURT: Okay. The jury heard the evidence, and we'll leave it go at that.

MR. PERSONIUS: In early January of 2010, if you recall from the evidence, we sent a private investigator, a retired FBI agent to go talk to Mr. Foersch. Talked to him twice. Those two interviews were separated by ten days. During the intervening ten days Mr. Foersch had the opportunity to talk with a DEC attorney.

During the first interview Mr. Foersch indicated to Mr. Thurston that he was fully aware that there were not baffles in either quench tower.

Mr. Foersch made no mention of Mr. Kamholz ever telling him that he had put baffles in quench tower number 2.

Mr. Thurston came back. He gave Mr. Foersch —
the second time he came back after Mr. Foersch had
talked to this DEC attorney, and he said, I want
you to review my report, and I want you to make any
changes to the report that you'd like to.

Mr. Foersch read it. The only change he made was
to say, well, I want you to take out the word

"fully" in front of the "aware", and the word

"aware" was in front of "aware there was no baffles
in both quench towers", so Mr. Thurston crossed out
the word "fully". It was the only change he asked
to be made to the report. He didn't say anything
at that interview about Mr. Kamholz having told him
he put baffles in quench tower number 2.

Mr. Foersch then testified in the grand jury during 2010. I can't remember if it was March or July, sometime in 2010, a little later in the year. And he was extensively questioned by the government about his interaction with Mr. Kamholz and these baffles. And Mr. Foersch testified about looking at the tower and seeing that it was -- in the grand jury said it was in disrepair. This was the last

time he looked.

And he was asked in the grand jury -- you remember he was impeached on this. Impeached means you read somebody's prior statement and try to demonstrate that it's inconsistent with what he's testifying to at trial, which, by the way, is a very important piece of evidence, as the Judge has told you, to weigh in assessing the credibility of a witness.

Back in the grand jury when Mr. Foersch testified about looking in this tower and it was in disrepair. He was asked did you do any follow up? And his answer was no. A few questions later he was asked did you ever talk to Mr. Kamholz again about it? Specific question, perfect opportunity to say yeah, a year later, a year later I went back and asked him, and he told me they weren't there. He said I don't recall talking to Mr. Kamholz.

Somehow between 2010 and the time he sits in a public courtroom Mr. Foersch's memory changes. And I don't mean to criticize him for what he did. He was put in a very, very bad spot. He's the one who was this 30-year face of the DEC. He's in a bad spot. He's sitting in a courtroom, not as many people as there are here now, but he was put in a

bad spot. But if you recall his testimony, he was pretty much at ease when he started. And as we got closer and closer, as the years passed and we got to those letters from December of '96 and January of '97, if you recall, his comfort level in the witness box changed, and he became less and less comfortable. And it's understandable that he would because he's in a bad way.

But what I suggest to you is that his recall that he testified to here that the government wants you to rely on as good evidence, that you wouldn't hesitate to act upon is not good evidence. And he's misremembering what happened, and he's doing it because he was put in a bad spot, and he was embarrassed. You recall, I came back on at that point, redirect or whatever it was, and I asked him, and I said in your heart of hearts isn't it true you knew there were no baffles in there? And he had that pained look on his face. He became very uncomfortable, and I hated to do it to him, but he said yeah, yeah, I knew they weren't there.

And on the last point on this, do you think for a minute if the government really believes that that happened, do you think for a minute if they had a witness who had directly lied to a DEC

officer and said he put baffles in there when he didn't, do you think for a minute that they wouldn't have called him as their witness? Of course, they would have. But they didn't. We had to call him. So my point is that didn't happen.

It was suggested in opening and it was carried forth in the government's closing that there was an effort, and apparently the claim involves

Mr. Kamholz, this is number five, to delay these inspectors when they came to Tonawanda Coke. And this was part of this scheme of deception. There is the guard house, and they would have to wait there before they could come into the plant. And Mr. Kamholz or somebody else would some out and greet the inspectors.

Mr. Kibler, who is the gentleman who was involved in those 303 -- the daily 303 inspections, the oven batteries, he was asked about that. He said, no, no, that didn't happen. There's no delay. No, I came in, I went over, I changed, and I went out, and I did my inspection.

There was an attempt with the volunteer fireman yesterday, two days ago -- I'm losing track of my days -- two days ago, the volunteer fireman,

Mr. Ianello, there was an attempt to suggest with

him that when he came to the facility looking for the fire and the guard didn't immediately let him drive through, that that somehow was a manifestation of this same type of improper conduct.

Sometimes you take reality and you stretch it too far, hesitate to act in the most important of your own affairs. But more to the point, during the cross-examination of Mr. Foersch, Mr. Piaggione asked him, well -- because he could because it was cross -- isn't it true that every time you came out there Mr. Kamholz knew exactly what you were going to do? And my recall of Mr. Foersch's response, no, that's not true. He had no idea what I was going to do when I came out there. There is no evidence in the record that supports that allegation by the government that they continue to argue in their closing.

Number six, reference was made to a conference that Mr. Heukrath testified about, and he was one of the later witnesses in the case. You'll remember Mr. Heukrath, he gave the longest description of his employment history in the history of mankind. He went on for a couple of pages of the transcript describing his past

history. He's an earnest man, and he's very precise, and certainly came across as a credible witness.

But, in any event, he testified about conversation he had with Mr. Kamholz in the fall of 2009. And it had to do with benzene emissions, and he recalled that Mr. Kamholz responded, well, there's no restriction on the amount of benzene emissions, and that's how it was left on direct, that's how it was left during the government's closing.

On cross-examination I went up and I said, do you remember what the context -- do you remember what the context of the conversation was, and Mr. Heukrath fortunately did. And he said, yeah, I remember I was talking to him about quench towers in the AC building. He wasn't talking about waste heat stacks or pressure relief valves or anything else. But you need to know that to be able to put that comment in meaning, or is it better to just say that Mr. Kamholz said to Mr. Heukrath that there's no restrictions on benzene emissions?

Well, again, you got to know the context. You got to look at the circumstances when the comment was made and what the conversation was that took

place at that time.

Number seven, and this was mentioned again in closing, that back in the '90s both Mr. Brossack and Mr. Priamo -- Anthony Brossack worked in the battery area. He was like the third witness. And Mr. Priamo was the gentleman with the nice mustache. But in any event, they both remembered that back in the '90s they talked to Mr. Kamholz on an occasion when the pressure relief valve released and asked him if it was okay, and he said it was. And that makes him deceitful or manipulative? Or is that simply Mr. Kamholz's expressing his good faith belief that as far as he knew it was okay, that the way the valve was being used that that's okay? Is that some indication he's a bad person?

Number eight, and again it came up in closing, and this ran through the trial and I'm not sure where it goes or what it means. But Mr. Brossack remembered that back in the '90s Mr. Kamholz on one occasion after something had happened, Mr. Brossack was on the radio and referred to a quench tower — or quench station as a quench tower, and that this difference between a tower and a station was somehow important and somehow shows that he's less than honest.

And witness after witness was asked, and they said it doesn't -- it has no meaning. It doesn't matter. It doesn't mean anything. But to the government it apparently means something. And beyond that, not that it matters, but Mr. Patel remembered that -- the gentleman from New York

City -- he remembered that there was a MACT, they call it a MACT standard -- that specifically talked about the difference -- if it matters between a tower and a station. I don't think it does matter, but the government chooses to continue to bring it up. It doesn't mean Mark Kamholz can't be trusted or that he was stacking the deck against the DEC.

This was mentioned once, and it hasn't come up, but I'm telling you everything I could figure out that was an attempt to try to tar Mark Kamholz's image. You've heard a lot about the emission study from July of 2003, and it's mostly about the -- the table in it that has the information about the PRV on the coke oven gas line. You've heard a lot about that.

Well, there's another page in that exhibit, again it's Government Exhibit 131, and at page 2-10 there is a discussion of the quenching system at Tonawanda Coke. And what it says in there is that

there is a single quench tower at Tonawanda Coke and it has baffles. And if you recall, this is why it stands out in my mind, when that was read Judge Skretny stopped and said, did you say quench tower as opposed to towers? And the witness or the person questioning, somebody said yes. And the point is that's wrong. It's incorrect.

And what I want to suggest to you is so what?

Mr. Kamholz didn't write it. He submitted it, but
he didn't write that. The fact that it refers to a
tower is an indication that the author did not have
good information on what that meant, but beyond
that, remember what that study was. And this helps
explain why Mr. Kamholz would have missed it. If
and when, you got to assume he looked at it, but
why he would have missed it.

This study had to do with -- some of you know more about this than I do -- HAPS emissions. And it had to do with leaks. What relevance would what was going on in the quench tower have to do with that anyway? And I only mention that because it helps explain why Mr. Kamholz would have missed that. I don't know if it's going to come up on rebuttal. Again, it's there. I want to try to identify everything I can for you and explain to

you why what the government is trying to do here, it just doesn't wash. And the other point about it is that reference is completely immaterial to the purpose -- to the purpose of the study.

There was a lot made of the annual and semi-annual certifications that would be prepared by Mr. Kamholz, and starts at Government Exhibit 31, prepared by Mr. Kamholz, and then signed by the plant manager. And we had a couple witnesses talk about how they didn't like having to sign those.

And again, if that concerns you, if you take a look at the forms, what you'll see is they are clearly set up so that a person who knows about what's being reported fills it out and signs it.

And Mark Kamholz signed every one of those and somebody who is a responsible party, i.e. the plant manager, is expected to also sign them. There's nothing improper or sinister about those forms or the fact that they're signed by both Mr. Kamholz and the plant manager.

Something that hasn't been mentioned since it was brought out, but it came out in Mr. Brossack's testimony is you've heard about what's called the beehive. The beehive is when the exhauster shuts

down. When the exhauster shuts down, you're not sucking the gas out of the battery. The exhauster pulls the gas towards the exhauster, and when it goes to the other side, it pushes it away. So it's like a vacuum cleaner sucking it up and pushing it out the other side. If the exhauster dies, there's nothing that pulls that coke oven gas out of the battery.

So, what you have to do at that point is that's when you have to light this flare. It's a rare occurrence. It doesn't happen often at all. But the government asked Mr. Brossack about beehiving, and Mr. Brossack recalled a conversation that he had with Mr. Kamholz where Mr. Brossack had had an experience where the exhauster was shut down for about 45 minutes, and Mr. Kamholz made some comment. It wasn't clear what he said, but something about ten minutes, that beehives don't last more than ten minutes. It's not clear what he said.

I'm not sure why it was brought up, but what came out of all of that was it lasts -- if there is a beehive, what do you do with it? We put it in the general foreman's report. What happens with the general foreman's report? Do the inspectors

look at that? And the answer was no. So, I don't know what the purpose -- maybe we'll find out on rebuttal why that's important. But I don't know what the point is. I don't know why it was brought up, and I don't know what it means.

And again, Mr. Brossack and Mr. Priamo each have been there over 30 years. Each of them said that there's been less than 30 -- less than 15 of these incidents, so it happens about once every two years. It's a very, very rare event that the beehive occurs. That's 11.

Now, number 12. And on this one, government, you got Mr. Kamholz. The battery flare. He shouldn't have let that happen. We admit that. We fess up to that one. That battery flare should have had the -- the automatic igniter, the pilot to do it. It should have and it didn't. It started in '94, lasted until 2008, about 14, 15 years. Granted that ties in with these beehives. So during that period of time it would have been used about seven or eight times, but it should have the pilot hooked up to it, and it didn't.

And it was suggested in the government's closing that that was Mr. Kamholz's decision to shut the natural gas off. My recall is I

specifically asked Mr. Brossack -- the way I said it was you don't mean to suggest to this jury that it was Mr. Kamholz's decision to turn off the natural gas, and he said oh, no, no. No, I don't mean to suggest that. Mr. Kamholz was the messenger. He's the one that said it's shut off because natural gas was expensive. The government recalled the testimony differently, and I think they're incorrect, because I remember asking the question. It wasn't Mark Kamholz's decision. But should he have not allowed that to happen?

And in the letter, this letter that came out in September of 2009. It gets answered by him in October of 2009 from Mr. Patel, that has a question in it that asked about the -- about this flare.

And that's the other example where there is a question that asks for information and documents going back five years. And that's question number 33, and it's in Exhibit 126. And the way

Mr. Kamholz answers that question is -- he doesn't lie, but he simply says there are no documents. He just doesn't answer the question about whether or not it hadn't operated in the past five years, and he should have.

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So, one instance. Thirty years, 12-hour search, ten-month investigation, full power of the grand jury, complete federal investigation, and one instance where Mr. Kamholz is subject to criticism.

We're going talk about the entrapment by estoppel now. It's very, very important to us that you give consideration to this defense in this case, and it explains why we took the time we did with these different DEC witnesses to talk about what their relationship was with Mr. Kamholz and with Tonawanda Coke. And what I suggest to you that we drew out of that evidence is that, number one, the relationship that Tonawanda Coke had from 1980 or so, however far you want to go back, until 2009, until April of 2009, it was with the It wasn't with the EPA. EPA had come out there twice to do inspections, and Mr. Foersch couldn't remember anything about them. One around 1990, another around 2000. That's the only time they had been there.

Then, as the way Mr. Linsin described it, there's a new sheriff in town. They come in in April of 2009, they do this inspection, and then there's a tsunami change in what the regulatory attitude is. And it's our position that that just

isn't fair. It isn't fair to prosecute a company or an individual for what they've been doing for 30 years that they thought was okay because another agency, the feds, decide to come in and read the rules differently.

And provided the elements are met, and we embrace those elements that have to be met, provided those are met, you have the authority, the power -- what is it, where there's great power, there's great responsibility. You have the power to decide this case based on that defense. We have the burden -- it's not beyond a reasonable doubt, but we have to show that it's more likely than not that this circumstance prevailed.

One of the reasons we called Gary Foersch as a witness when the government didn't was because it was a great way to try to describe to you what that relationship was between Mr. Kamholz, Tonawanda Coke, and the DEC. And I suggest to you that what you found from his testimony is that it was a good, positive, productive relationship, that they got the work done, that Mr. Kamholz wasn't in his pocket, that there was no fix. It was outgoing, honest relationship over those 30 years.

Not everything was documented. Some of

Mr. Foersch's reports leave something to be desired, but the work was done. The focus was put where it should be. It was put on the battery, because that's where the problems are, and things were taken care of. If there was a question or a concern, you call, and it would get taken care of.

Remember Mr. Sitzman testified, yeah, I remember that. He remembered a time that he wanted to come out, there is some complaint about these emissions. He said I want to go out and I wanted to check the emissions in the battery. He called Mark, and Mark said, yeah, come on out. So he came out at eleven at night. Was Mark there? Yes, he was. And until two in the morning he checked the emissions. And Mark was there with him. Stayed the whole time.

He mentioned another example where the Tonawanda Coke, on its own, because there was some complaint about these emissions it raised its waste heat stack by 30 or 40 feet to try to help address that issue. That's the kind of relationship that it was. They weren't going to get hung up on formalities. They were going to get the job done and the job did get done.

Now, I want to take that, and I want to apply

step-by-step with you how we think this entrapment by estoppel defense applies to one of the set of the charges. I'm not going to go through all of them, because we will be here two or three hours. I won't get your attention for that long. I want to do it with one, and then I'll briefly touch on the others.

I want to talk about quench tower number 2, because that was the main issue really with Mr. Foersch. And you recall that Mr. Foersch candidly and honestly admitted that he would have discussions with Mark Kamholz about quench tower number 2, and about this idea of the steam and if you reduce the size of the tower, Mr. Linsin said this is simple physics. No physics is simple. But you reduce the size of the tower, as the steam goes up, it doesn't go up as fast, so you're not pulling those particulates up. And therefore the purpose of the baffles is either limited or not existence.

And Mr. Foersch said yeah, we had those discussions, and I agreed with Mark about that.

And he went on to say I talked to Henry Sandonato, my supervisor, about it, and he agreed too, that the baffles really weren't efficient. And I told Mark that I didn't think that they were.

And he testified -- we ultimately got out of him, as he had told Mr. Thurston, and as he testified in the grand jury, he knew there were no baffles in that quench tower number 2, he being Mr. Foersch, he knew it. And when he was asked in the grand jury -- and we brought this out on his examination, when he was asked in the grand jury well, you knew it, but why didn't you do something about it, his response was, it was one of those discretionary things. It was one of those discretionary things.

That's what this case is about. It was 30 years, and that's what it was. And then April of 2009 it all changes. And the question is, is that fair?

Now, as far as the permit application was concerned that Mr. Kamholz put in which reinforces this, the government questioned this and tried to suggest it was improper. But if you recall, when the permit application was put in for the quench towers, for quench tower number 1, which is the east one that had the exemption, Mr. Kamholz in the application cited the Air 100 permit. He put the word in "exemption" I think.

For quench tower number 2, what Mr. Kamholz did

is he cited those two letters, the '96 and '97 letter, which kind of scratch your head and say why would you cite the '97 letter that says you have to have baffles? It's because it was known that even though that was in the letter, that wasn't the understanding. Why else would he cite that? And what he also cited which is important is he cited to the regulations. It's 6 New York Code Rules and Regulation, NYCRR. You don't need to do know all that. It's Part 214.

If you recall, there is a subdivision of Part 214 that says there is exemptions. And that's the one that Mr. Kamholz cited. He cited 214.10, which is the exemption section. He specifically told the DEC and whoever was reviewing this what his understanding was.

And then what happened? The permit comes out and guess what? Condition 96 for tower number 1 says you got to have baffles. And condition 97 comes out for tower number 2 and that says you have to have baffles. And you heard the government argue that means you've got a problem with number 2. We're going to let you off on number 1, but not on number 2.

But that's not even totally true, because Mr.

Eng testified that as far as the EPA was concerned, it didn't matter for quench tower number 1 that you had the exemption. The permit overrode that exemption. That isn't the position the government's taking here, but that was the attitude of the EPA. And again, is that fair? Is that the way our government should work?

So what we have happening at trial now is the following. The government is willing to concede, as I think they must, that the exemption applies to tower number 1, this Air 100 from 1984, whenever it was. They conceded that. And their point there is how often the quench tower was used. I'll get to that in a minute. For quench tower number 2 the government is saying no, no, no, doesn't matter what relationship you have with Mr. Foersch. It doesn't matter that you put that exemption section in your permit application, doesn't matter. You're guilty of five separate felonies for not having baffles in there, even though the DEC representative knew about that.

So to apply this entrapment by estoppel defense to quench tower number 2 the first question is was there a disclosure of the condition or activity to the governmental entity? And here there clearly

was. Mr. Foersch has acknowledged I knew there were no baffles in quench tower number 2. So there was a disclosure. He knew about it, no question.

And then number two, did Tonawanda Coke and Mr. Kamholz rely upon the authority of whoever it was that they were dealing with? Of course, Mr. Kamholz did. He put it right in the permit that he did. He cited those two letters, which makes no sense, in the exemption section, and said we don't need them for here.

Is there something inequitable about the government now enforcing condition 97? Well, of course there is. And does the evidence tell you that even though condition 97 which said baffles in question number 2, which was in effect from 2002 to the present, that Mr. Foersch never enforced that. Is there a certain unfairness there to now say you're guilty of five felonies? We think so, and that's why that that defense — this is a textbook case for this defense. And you don't get many of them. But this is the one. And you have the power to apply it to these facts.

Beyond everything else, proof -- if you ever get to this point of saying we're convinced on whatever count that guilt has been proven for every

element for that count, presumption is gone, guilty. Even if you got to that point, you have the authority to apply this defense, that's how powerful it is. And it's a once-in-a-million opportunity that you have. But it applies, it applies in this case.

Now, I'm not going to go through the other counts in detail, but I'm going to quickly suggest to you why we think -- why we think it applies. To the pressure relief valve, was there a disclosure? Yes, there was. Of course there was. It was disclosed in the emission study table back in July of 2003. It was open and obvious. As Mr. Linsin asked one of the witnesses, was a shroud put over it? Of course not. It was out in the open. Even Mr. Foersch, when he saw a picture of it said, yeah, that sure looks like an emission point to me. It was there. It was easily to be seen. It was disclosed.

There were these full compliance evaluations that you heard about. And the testimony is that a full compliance evaluation is supposed to be done every year. Every year. And it's supposed to identify, not only the permitted emission points, but also the unpermitted emission points. And

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there's one of those completed every year. Every year that said that Tonawanda Coke was in compliance. And now to say five felonies for that, is that fair?

Quench tower number 1, I'm not going to take time on that. That comes down to whether you think that there was evidence that you wouldn't hesitate on that shows that that exemption doesn't apply. In other words, that number 1 was being used more than 10 percent of the time. I'll touch on that in just a minute. The evidence isn't there to support not applying that exemption. But even on that one, what you have that suggests this unfairness is the Eng email from December 30th of 2009, the Eng email where he knows from Mr. Sitzman that this exemption has existed at that point for 25 years, and he represents the EPA and says it doesn't matter to They missed it. He sends the email that says DEC missed it, and Tonawanda Coke didn't notice it, or something, not knowing about the relationship that existed between Mr. Foersch and Mr. Kamholz. And he says so we're going to site them for a violation for that. Is that fair? Is that how we want our government to act?

And then Counts 17 and 18, and this applies

more to 18. Eighteen is the count that has to do with taking the substance out of that tank with an excavator, putting it in a front end loader, and taking it over and putting it into the coal piles. And remember that in June of 2009 Mr. Corbett was told about that by Mr. Kamholz, told about that by Mr. Kamholz. And the fellow from the EPA, Mr. Grossman, said don't tell Kamholz we have concerns. We want to do some sampling before we do anything.

In the intervening three months what

Mr. Kamholz told them they were going to do was

done. It was taken over and put in the coal pile.

Exactly what Mr. Kamholz said they were going to do

is done. And they come back in September '09, and

lo and behold, it's been done.

So now that's another felony count, because EPA said, no, don't tell Kamholz not to do that. Don't tell him not to do that, get a felony out of that. Is that fair? Is that the way we want our government to act?

It bothered Mr. Corbett so much, if you'll recall, he went to Mr. O'Connor after he had been interviewed by the government and said, you know, this is bothering me. I've got to let you know.

would have told him about this, but Mr. Grossman told me not to. It's pretty sad.

And then for Count 19, the tar decanter sludge.

That's the stuff that they put in the front end

loaders and take it out to the coal pile. And

there what you have, you have the inspection

reports, the one from Mr. Fisher goes back to '89,

and they move forward. You have the disclosure.

You certainly have in -- before that you have the

EPA reports. But the key there is the 1989

inspection report, Defendants' Exhibit B.

And then you've got the later inspection reports too, but that's not all you have. You have Mr. Strickland's testimony, because what the government kept trying to get these witness to say is nobody went out and checked. And Mr. Strickland said, no, it doesn't work that way. It's not just based on conversation. These reports are based on conversation and observation.

Where is Mr. Fisher? If it's otherwise, where's Mr. Fisher? Where is he? Did you see him take the stand? And who is it, who is it that tells the DEC and EPA in April of 2000, who volunteers that this is what they're doing? Mark Kamholz during the air inspection has a

conversation with Cheryl Webster from the DEC, who also wasn't called to testify by the government, and tells her, oh, yeah, this is what we do. We've been doing this for a long time.

She gets ahold of her supervisor, Sitzman.

Sitzman gets ahold of I think it's Strickland.

Strickland gets ahold of Corbett, that's how this whole thing starts, because he tells Cheryl Webster about it. And then when Mr. Corbett comes out in June of '09, along with Mr. Grossman, and they talk to Mark about it, he openly discloses this is a routine practice. We've been doing this for a long, long time. Disclosure, candor, openness, or deception?

And every one of these conditions as soon as

Tonawanda Coke was told by the EPA you can't mix it
on the coal piles, you got to put baffles in, and
even with a PRV they weren't told anything. They
did it totally on their own. The PRV, set point
gets raised, and then it's blanked off by Tonawanda
Coke. Baffles are put in in both quench towers
within months, and immediately after the search
warrant Tonawanda Coke starts using the pad. As
soon as they are told this is how we want you to do
it, that's what Tonawanda Coke does.

The problem is for the 30 years before that that's not what DEC told them. And that's why we have this defense, that's why I say this is a textbook case. Textbook case where that defense applies.

Just something brief. Mr. Linsin asked me to mention this. I stay away from these RCRA counts like it's the flu, because I don't understand it.

But he wanted me to make the point. When you're considering the RCRA counts, please don't make judgments on how this was done and say well, maybe this should have been done a different way. Accept how it was done and assess whether or not that violates RCRA. Maybe there was a better way that you could have taken -- scooped the material out of the abandoned tanks. But that's not for you to decide. It's the way they did it, and you gauge whether there is a violation or not on that -- on that evidence.

I started out by talking about -- I can't remember his name now -- Paul Harvey. And first words I said to you were don't let the facts get in the way of a good story. And I think that's -- that's what the case has been about. I want to give you a few examples of what I'm talking about

and suggest to you that it carries over to all the proof in this case.

Let's talk for a minute -- these are brief, except for the last one. But let's talk for a minute about the -- sorry. Judge, I'm sorry -- about the quench towers. And the issue here is quench tower number 1 and whether the exemption applies. Was quench tower number 1 used more than 10 percent of the time? We have two witnesses who worked on the battery, worked on the battery for years and years and years, Mr. Brossack and Mr. Priamo, who said no. Quench tower 1 was -- it was a backup. It wasn't used more than 10 percent of the time. It was quench number 2 that we used. In other words, the exemption applies.

And why is that important? Well, they work in the battery. They work right where the quench tower is used day-in and day-out. What does the government want you to rely on? What do they want you to rely on to find the exemption doesn't apply? Do you remember Mr. Hoffmann? If I remember Mr. Hoffmann he's the gentleman that was fired and he doesn't know why he was fired, and from time to time he would drive a pickup truck around in the coal fields. And he said that he would stand out

in the coal fields and pay attention to which quench tower was being used, and he would see the smoke, and he'd watch the smoke blow with the wind.

Come on. Do you want -- you're going to -- in a matter of importance to you you're going rely on that kind of evidence as opposed to what

Mr. Brossack and Mr. Priamo say? I don't think so.

And that's just one idea of what I'm talking about.

Graphic example is the fire, the July 8, 2008, fire. And the first -- my impression of that, until we talked to Mr. Ianello and saw his video clip was that this was an inferno, that this was a huge fire that consumed two of the large tanks or area of the tanks. It was a big, big fire.

And you had Mr. Dahl come in. And Mr. Dahl had testified in the grand jury that he saw a little tar seeping out of one of the tanks during the fire. And he got on the stand here and testified that he saw -- I don't know how many front end loaders come flowing out of those tanks, and he said it was 10 or 20 tons, 10 or 20 tons flowed out of there.

We called Mr. Ianello, someone the government had talked to. We put Mr. Ianello on the stand, the fire chief. He brought the video clip with

him. And we found out this was not an inferno. His testimony was he didn't see any -- anything coming out of the tanks at all. And if you want to consider the government's suggestion, well, it was coming out underneath the water, I guess you can, but is that speculation? And are you supposed to rely on speculation? I don't think so.

And he played that video clip and we played it over and over, and it became clear there was a lot of smoke. And we've heard the expression, my grandmother used to say — she'd laugh and say where there's smoke there's fire. I never really knew what that meant. What I understand that to mean that isn't true that where there's smoke there's fire. And there was a lot of smoke. There was a lot of black smoke, but there wasn't much fire.

What you heard from Mr. Ianello was that this fire was limited to about one-quarter or one-third of one tank in the southwest corner of the tank.

There was that building, that's where the fire was.

That's what the video clip showed.

On cross-examination the government played that video clip for Mr. Ianello and said, do you see this area over here, you're saying the fire wasn't

over here, and there was that other area where a tank had been torn down, that either Mr. Dahl or Mr. Hoffman, one of the government's witnesses said, yeah, the fire was over there. Mr. Ianello said clearly the fire wasn't over there, no where near there.

And the government asked Mr. Ianello is it possible that the Tonawanda employees put that out before you got there? That's not the kind of evidence when we're talking about what's at stake here that you should be relying on. And then played the clip again and based on how the smoke was traveling tried to suggest that that meant the fire was over there, because the smoke was blowing in a northerly direction. That's not good evidence.

This is a serious case, and you got to make a determination that overcomes the presumption of innocence and finds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and it can't be based on that type of -- that type of testimony.

The last thing that I want to cover, and I'm going to shorten this up, which should make you happy, because I would love to put this out there, but there's not time. I want to talk about the

government's summary chart. I'm going to try to do it without putting it up there.

Remember Mr. Conway testified about this? You have the orange chart and then you have the green chart for the months. And those charts, there is — there's nothing about those charts that you can rely on. But the government wants you to rely on those. And hopefully you can remember this from my examination. But I feel like I've taken too long.

Government Exhibit 200 is the orange chart, and that purports to have in it Mr. Conway's review of every single one of the by-product operator log books. And every time the set point changed, he put it in there. And recall that based on that he then look's at the circular charts, and every time he sees a spike above what he decided that set point was, he's going to call that a release, and he's going to prepare this chart, and it's going to show that this PRV was releasing about twice an hour. That's what he claims — the government claims the chart shows.

And what we attempted to show on cross were any number of things why this was really bad, bad information. And the first is if you go back and

you look at the orange chart, there are 2 instances on the chart, one is for August 29th of 2007 and October 7 of 2007, where the entry for August 29th will show one set point, and when you look at the very next entry that they've shown, it clearly indicates between the first and the second entry there's been a change, and it's not reflected anywhere. And that happens twice on the charts between August 29th of '07 and October 7 of '07. And it happens again between September 30 of '08 and March 2nd of '09.

Remember with Mr. Conway when I asked him about the first one, his response was, well, that doesn't matter because that's not part of my charts, because his charts only went through '09. Well, guess what? As I just indicated, the second time it happens it does affect his charts, and it affects the entries for January and February. They are clearly wrong, because he has missed the fact that at some point between September 30th of '08 and March 2nd of '09 there was a change in the set point. We don't know when it was. Was it March 1st of '09? Was it October 1st of '08? We don't know. But you got that chart in evidence and you're supposed to rely upon that to determine if

the company and Mr. Kamholz are guilty. You can't use that chart for anything except as an indication of the quality of the evidence -- or lack of quality of the evidence that's been presented to you.

You were told that Mr. Conway skips April of 2009 because that's an unreliable month.

Apparently because the inspection happened and Mr. Cahill says he raised and dropped the set point, so they skip April of 2009. So what do they do for May of 2009? He uses a setting from March of 2009, even though he's admitted that — that you can't rely on April. We know there were changes in April. But he takes a setting in March and uses that in May. So May is not — is not reliable.

You know that it was never calibrated. You know that he relied on testimony outside the courtroom that we don't know about. You know that there were other changes that were shown in the log book that he just ignored because there wasn't a number. It wasn't convenient to use those, because there that was an indication the set point changed, but since you didn't know what the number was, he ignored it and just didn't use it. And yet you'll get this chart.

You know from Mr. Sitzman that he determined -Mr. Sitzman determined that that PRV was not
releasing as of the fall of '09. But look at
Mr. Conway's chart, and he's got it releasing every
half hour.

And this is the most troubling part of all.

There is a Government Exhibit -- this is the one I

want to put up please, Government Exhibit 88-0122.

This is from -- well, let's just make this part

bigger please.

This is very important. July 30th, 2009. And the entry right there, the note. We do have radios and a phone. If Mr. Cahill makes an adjustment on anything, I believe it would be appropriate to inform operators.

That doesn't appear in Mr. Conway's chart.

It's smack dab in the middle of the summer of 2009.

It's important for a couple reasons. Number one,

it shows that Mr. Cahill was making changes and not

putting them in the book. It also shows he was

making changes in the summer of '09 that aren't

reflected anywhere, and the government just ignores

that when it makes this chart to argue to you that

these releases continued every half an hour through

all of 2009.

How can you do that? How can you do that and expect you as a jury to rely on that evidence as proof of anything? It just -- it defies logic.

And is it fair to do that?

And then Mr. Cratsley -- you're not going to remember this -- on top of that, Mr. Cratsley, who is one of the by-products operators -- you can take that down -- he testified too that as of the time of the search warrant the setting was at 160. 160. There's nothing close to that in Mr. Conway's chart. And the other thing that Mr. Conway acknowledged is he reviewed every single one of these log books, and indeed Mr. Cahill never put his entries in the log book.

I'm done. I'm not going to do any fancy wrap
up. I'm not even going to thank you for listening.
I'm not even going to do that. The one thing I'm
going to say, I am going to say Mark didn't
testify. My decision. You've heard enough. You
don't need testimony from him. There is reasonable
doubt on every one of these charges. We've
established entrapment by estoppel defense by a
preponderance, and I will say thank you for your
attention today, for the entire trial, for your
questions. Never had an experience like this

before. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: What are you thinking? Ready for a break? How about if we take 15, okay, and then we will have the rebuttal argument, and then we'll break for lunch. Does that work for everybody? You've been terrific. Thank you.

(Jury excused from the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Okay. We will see you in 15 minutes.

MR. LINSIN: Thank you, Judge.

(Short recess was taken.)

(Jury seated.)

THE COURT: Welcome back. Please have a seat. Okay. The attorneys and parties are back, present. Our jury is back, roll call waived. This will be, ladies and gentlemen, the last of the arguments. And if you recall, whatever the attorneys say and I say that's not evidence. Please don't lose sight of that. And please don't make up your mind on this case until you commence your deliberations, and then you will have everything you need at that point in time.

The gentleman sitting on the edge of his seat there ready to get up, Mr. Piaggione, is ready with I think his rebuttal argument. Mr. Piaggione.

MR. PIAGGIONE: Thank you, your Honor. May I proceed then?

THE COURT: You may proceed, yes.

MR. PIAGGIONE: Thank you. Mr. Personius, Mr. Linsin, Miss Grasso, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I've been sitting here waiting for about five weeks to speak to you, and I'm just hoping that you're not too tired to listen at this point.

I would first of all thank you again for your service. I know some of you did not want to be here. But you did make the effort and you did show up, and you did make -- came every day and showed attention, and I applaud you for that, and thank you for that.

But I'm going to ask you for your patience and attention just a little longer. This is the government's opportunity to respond to those last three hours of arguments you heard from the defendants. And throughout this whole proceeding, the Court has told you use your common sense in evaluating these facts. Use your common sense, and the government wants you to follow that advice because if you do, you will look right through the defendants' arguments and realize that they're -- they don't hold -- they don't hold up.

I'm going to first try and address Mr. Linsin's arguments, and then I want to clear up some of the confusion Mr. Personius apparently expressed in his argument. The thing to remember though is don't let the defendants' arguments make you think there's some sort of alternative reality in this courtroom.

You know, use your common sense. If two plus two equals four outside this courtroom, it equals four inside this courtroom. And this concept that the defense has put forth of a perspective of 20 to 30 years of environmental compliance, when you look at it through common sense, you realize it's 20 to 30 years of environmental deception.

Defendants argue that, first of all, if you remember that the cost of compliance was minimal. I wonder if I can have 15.02.003, Miss DiFillipo.

Do you recall this place looked like during the April 2009 inspection? This is a tank in operation.

Can I have 15.02.015 please, Miss DiFillipo?

This is where this machinery was spewing oil,
so to prevent people being sprayed by it, they put
a rag over it. Does this look like a company who
invested in its operations? And if the costs of

compliance was minimal, then why ask for an exemption for the west tower to begin with? Why not just put the baffles in in 1984 and use it whenever you wanted to?

Why resist putting in an automatic flare on the battery when the regulation was passed? If you remember, they tried to say we don't need one, and then the EPA had to come back and said, no, you have to put one in. Why not replace the baffles in the east quench tower in 1997? If it didn't cost them anything, why not just do it? And why not get a permit and a flare on the bleeder valve in the by-products area?

The government submits you might consider because the defendants did not want to spend a dime more than they had to on environmental compliance.

And I don't want you to get confused with the defendants' claims of estoppel by entrapment.

Estoppel by entrapment defense requires the defendant to reasonably disclose its conduct before or at the time it claims the government authorized it. Okay. And they had to rely upon that authorization to commit this conduct. In other words, if the defendants committed an illegal act, then went back and disclosed it to the government,

that is not estoppel. They have to seek that approval before or at the time they commit this illegal act, and that's important to understand. That the government has to be aware of what is going on and then authorize it. It's not if the government conducts an inspection and doesn't detect a violation. That's not estoppel.

Now, let's consider defendants' arguments as they look -- if you look at them through just plain common sense, okay? First of all, Counts 1 through 5 there is this claim that this was open and obvious. First of all, if you recall, the DEC was there less than twice a year. They were there to do inspections which were focused on the battery, not on the by-products area. These annual inspections, as the inspectors indicated, the one inspector indicated didn't physically check every condition. What they did is they relied upon the defendants to be in compliance on those conditions they didn't check.

And as it was testified to, Mr. Kamholz knew where the inspector went. When he accompanied the inspector, he could see where he went. So he knew what the pattern was. And if you remember,

Mr. Foersch said he was in the by-products area 15

times in 25 years. Fifteen times. So, he did not notice the bleeder valve.

If you recall, he didn't have to walk past the bleeder valve either. On direct testimony

Mr. Foersch indicated he was driven to the by-products area by Mr. Kamholz. So he was there 15 times.

Now, you recall Mr. Kibler. He said he was there a thousand times. That was his testimony, a thousand times. He came — his testimony also said he came within 10 feet of the by-products area. He was there a thousand times and never noticed the bleeder valve.

So I submit to you it's not so open and obvious as the defendants are claiming it is. Common sense tells you the government doesn't even have to make this argument really, if you think about it. The Clean Air Act requires that the defendant get a permit for its emission sources, including that bleeder valve. It's the law. And it's not conditioned upon only if the DEC finds it. They have that obligation to put it on their permit.

Let me give you a common day analogy to this.

If you drive in Buffalo, you have to get a driver's license. That's the law. It's incumbent upon you

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to take that test and get the license and pay a fee. Okay. Suppose someone here in Buffalo decides he's not going to get a driver's license. And he drives around Buffalo for 20 years.

Now there are some days when you drive around Buffalo that idea might not be so farfetched. the fact of the matter is one day this driver gets stopped by the police, and he gets arrested for driving without a license. Now is it a defense for that driver to say I've been driving around Buffalo for 20 years openly and honestly, obviously. drove past the police station every day. I drove past police cars every day. I even stopped and talked to the police. One time I got a parking ticket, and I went into the police station and paid it. They asked me for ID. I said I don't have a driver's license, will this due, and they accepted that and they never arrested me. I've been misled by the police into believing I could drive without a license. Does that make sense to you? Just everyday common sense?

Using your common sense with the facts in this case, you can see that. Did the defendants rely on the conduct of the DEC to commit this violation of operating this bleeder valve, or did the defendants

commit this violation relying on not getting caught by the DEC? That's the difference. Did they rely on something the DEC did, or rather that they figured out the DEC was not going to do? They were not going to find this bleeder valve. And if it's the latter, it's not estoppel.

Now, let's look at this, what I would call, a fairy tale about the HAPS report constituting notification to the DEC. Let's put this report in context of common sense. The HAP report is about regulations that come out a year after the defendants got their Title V permit. And it is submitted by the defendants to the DEC, again, in an attempt to exempt Tonawanda Coke from new environmental regulations. And Mr. Kamholz signed that report saying if you have any questions, ask me about it. And they submit in that report this infamous table 4.2.

Can we have Exhibit 131.4-2, please? Okay. Thank you. All right.

Now, if you look at this table, there is a pressure relief valve in the coke oven gas system. There's also a valve listed in the coke oven gas system. In the light oil system there are no pressure relief valves listed. According to this

table, this pressure relief valve is not really emitting anything. This maybe has a leakage problem, and that's what that little formula indicates .00030. There's a leak coming there.

Certainly there's nothing on this pressure relief valve that indicates it's emitting 137 tons of coke oven gas. And again there's no separate entry for a pressure relief valve in the light oil system.

Miss Henderson, can I have Defendant's Exhibit FFFF please?

Now this is defendants' diagram of what the coke oven gas system is. This is their description, not the government's, okay? The government agrees this is accurate. If you notice, part of the coke oven gas system is the light oil scrubber, okay? Now, defendants try to claim that the light oil scrubber is part of the light oil system, but clearly there's overlap. It's listed there as part of the coke oven gas system.

Now, do you remember Miss Hamre's testimony? I wonder if I could -- thank you, Miss Henderson.

I wonder if I could have Exhibit 15.01.061, please?

Now, Miss Hamre said when she was going through

the by-products area they found a pressure relief valve. Right there. And if you notice, it's not one that actively emits gas. It waits, if there's a problem, it would open. The only thing it may have is an issue of leaks. There is no separate entry again on that table that says there's a pressure relief valve in the light oil system. There's only one pressure relief valve listed between the light oil system and the coke oven gas system.

If I can go back to 131.4-2 please. Okay.

Again, if there was -- there is valves -- and valves there. But there is a separate entry for pressure relief valves. So between the two systems for this to be accurate, there has to be either a separate entry for a pressure relief valve in the light oil system, or there has to be two pressure relief valves in the coke oven gas system.

And if you look at it, which is the -- now we know there is a second pressure relief valve in the coke oven gas system. It's the bleeder valve. And if you look at this description, this is not the one that's emitting 173 tons of coke oven gas. In other words, the one that was left out was the bleeder valve. The government submits that this

HAP report didn't notify anyone about the bleeder. It wasn't even included in the report. The only pressure relief valve listed here is the one on the light oil scrubber, which by the defendants' own admission, is part of the coke oven gas system.

You can consider that this claim now, that the HAP report provided some sort of notification about the bleeder valve is a story made up after the defendants got indicted. If you look at it, that makes -- doesn't that make common sense to you? If they wanted to include the bleeder valve, there would have been a second entry. Or if they wanted to distinguish there would have been one in the light oil system.

Now do you recall, while we're on this subject, that Miss Hamre -- take this down. Do you recall Miss Hamre testified that the defendant told the EPA inspection team there was no pressure relief valves in the coke oven gas system? And it was not in reference to the battery. That was her testimony. Defendants have tried to claim she didn't hear that correctly or she misheard it. It didn't happen.

Well, remember Mr. Linsin's question. He asked who in their right mind would claim there was no

pressure relief valves knowing there was one out there? Okay. Well, that would be the one who in 2009 had not included the bleeder valve in the HAP report. There had been no notification of the bleeder valve to the DEC or the EPA. And who told Pat Cahill not to have the bleeder valve go off during the inspection? As far as he knew there was no one in the government who knew about that bleeder valve.

And Mr. Linsin's second question referring to his claim that Mr. Foersch's testimony that Defendant Kamholz knew there were baffles in the east quench tower was fabricated. Remember that one? He said who in their right mind would tell an inspector there were baffles in the number two quench tower knowing they were not?

Can I have Exhibit 131.2-10 please?

Well, right there, that would be the same one who would put in a HAP report there were baffles in the tower six years after they were removed.

That's in the report. And the answer to that is the same, it's Mark L. Kamholz.

Some other statements I want to clarify the defendant made about these issues was coming out of the bleeder valve was this un -- I think it was

called purified gas, uncontradicted that it was purified gas coming out of the bleeder. Now, it's your recollection, not mine. But do you recall testimony about the bleeder valve being caught on fire twice? That in the winter there were emissions, that employees saw crystallized naphthalene in the air from the emissions from the bleeder valve, and that others smelled coke oven gas when it was released, and when the light oil scrubber went out of commission in 2008 meant there was going to be more benzene in the coke oven gas. Does your common sense tell you that sounds like purified gas?

Or the defense statement that the bleeder valve was insignificant? That was Mr. Linsin's words.

This bleeder valve was emitting 173 tons of benzene loaded coke oven gas a year. As presented at trial, that evidence, that amount alone would qualify a facility as a major source. It is submitted that perhaps the DEC might not find that so insignificant. Again, if it had been notified.

With respect to the defendants' characterizations regarding emission source and emission point, well, if you recall, both

Mr. Carlacci and Mr. Sitzman stated that while

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there was separate definitions in the regulations, that in this case and in many other cases, an emission source and emission point can be part of the same thing. The valve is the apparatus or the equipment that releases the gas. And the pipe is the point from which it goes into the environment.

They both said that -- that they -- they would have this bleeder valve on permit. uncontradicted. There wasn't a question of emission source or emission point. But even that argument, if you look at it from common sense, let's look at it this way. On top of the battery there is a flare stack. And when the coke oven gas pressure builds up in the battery, for some reason like the exhauster wasn't working, someone has to go up and turn a valve manually. That is the emission source, and this battery flare stack lets the gas come out and there is an automatic pilot light that sets it on fire if it's working, so that the escaping coke oven gas isn't emitted into the environment. Okay. So there is your emission point and emission source together.

The defendants knew this had to be on its permit. And it had to be flared if it was going to comply with the Clean Air Act. Now right down the

road in the by-products area is this other emission source where, when the coke oven gas builds up, it has an electronic set point that opens the valve, that's your emission source, and it goes up the pipe, that's your emission point. And that is done every day, daily, when there is a reversal in the ovens.

The defendants knew how to include the battery flare stack that was used occasionally in its

Title V permit. Does it make sense the defendants didn't understand that they had to also include the bleeder valve, which was doing basically the same thing every day? Does that make common sense to you?

Let's talk about the east quench tower. That's Counts 11 through 15. Now defendants have argued that they were misled by Gary Foersch into believing there were no need to put baffles in that tower. Now, again, just use your everyday common sense in looking at that. First, defendants request in this letter that they're going lower the -- lower the tower. And if you recall, Mr. Foersch wrote back and said in clear instructions, you can lower it, but you have to have baffles in that tower.

In fact, he testified on the stand it was for the very reason that he didn't know if the baffles were on the top of the tower or the bottom of the tower that he put that in there to make sure those baffles were there.

Now if you recall, Jon Rogers testified that the baffles were removed when the tower was lowered and never replaced. So the defendants now claim estoppel because Kamholz relied upon what Foersch said. Well, what part of that letter did Kamholz rely upon to remove the baffles? Remember estoppel only applies when the reasonable disclosure of the activity before or at the time of the conduct is authorized.

So, defendants went out and did this based upon a letter that said you can't do it. And now they're claiming they have authorization to do it.

Does that make common sense to you?

Do you recall again that Mr. Foersch stated that the inspector went everywhere -- that Mr. Kamholz went everywhere the inspector did? He knew that the inspectors rarely checked for baffles in the east quench tower. Mr. Foersch testified to that. He said it was a dangerous place to go. It was out of the way. They didn't really want to go

there. And the main focus of the inspections every year was on the battery, not on the quench towers.

You can consider that the Defendant Kamholz made a calculated decision not to replace the baffles in the east quench tower to save money.

And remember at that time, 1997 when this happened, Mr. Kamholz had already gone three years with the illegal removal of that automatic pilot light in the battery flare stack, and the DEC had not discovered it. It would take another 11 years before DEC discovered that violation.

So Defendant Kamholz removed the baffles in contradiction to the DEC letter stated, and before having any conversation with Foersch about it. You can consider that he made a calculated risk.

Basically, he didn't rely upon anything Mr. Foersch said. He relied upon Mr. Foersch not catching it.

With respect to this idea that he put it in his application for Title V, this reference to these letters, well, the letters, all they say is you have to have baffles. And if the height of the tower isn't sufficient, it's conditioned on you raising it. So is the reference to a condition of raising the tower, lowering the tower, but there's nothing about baffles in that.

I submit to you you may consider that his attempt to refer to that letter was an attempt to sneak past the DEC authorization that he couldn't get if he applied for a modification. And the testimony is the defendant knew how to apply for a modification of his permit, and he knew it had to be in writing. Again he didn't rely on authorization from Gary Foersch. He relied on not getting caught by Gary Foersch.

Let's look further at Defendant Kamholz and what he relied upon regarding Mr. Foersch's conduct even after he removed the baffles. Now again, it's your recollection that counts, not mine. But do you recall Mr. Foersch's testimony that he had many conversations with defendant regarding inefficiencies of the baffles, and he agreed with the defendants' theory? However, Mr. Foersch was clear on one point. He never told the defendant he could operate the east quench tower without baffles. Yes, I agree with you, Mr. Kamholz, but the regulations say you have to have baffles. What are we going to do?

And in addition, the defendant knew, as

Mr. Foersch testified, that Foersch didn't have

authority to change the permit. He didn't have the

authority to make modifications to the permit without it being in writing. The defendant knew the procedure, he knew how to do that. So is there any basis for Mr. Kamholz to reasonably rely on Gary Foersch, the inspector, modifying his Title V permit orally? Does that make any common sense to you?

You recall the testimony of Mr. Foersch there
was sometime post-1997 where he lowers the tower -after the tower was lowered, maybe as late as when
the Title V permit was issued. It's not really
clear. Mr. Foersch went to the east quench tower
with Mr. Kamholz. And they observed -- he doesn't
really recall. He remembers it was a violation.
He doesn't remember if it was no baffles or partial
baffles. And what did he say? What did he do?

(Interruption by telephone malfunction in
the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Okay. Lets get back to serious business.

MR. PIAGGIONE: Okay. With respect to Mr. Kamholz, he's looking up into the tower, and he says to Mr. Foersch -- reverse that. Mr. Foersch is looking up in the tower and he says to Mr. Kamholz, you've got to put baffles in that tower,

okay? If you recall, Kamholz didn't say in response well, I thought you gave me authority not to put baffles in the tower. He didn't say anything.

You have to draw your own conclusions about Mr. Foersch, whether Mr. Foersch was the type of person who could be easily manipulated or not. But do you recall Mr. Foersch said he trusted Kamholz. He trusted him to correct violations when they were pointed out to him. He relied upon the defendant to put the baffles back into the tower. And as he testified, he said he didn't follow up right away, because he believed Mr. Kamholz was going to do what he told him to do.

However, as Mr. Foersch stated, he felt in his gut that maybe Mr. Kamholz didn't do what he was supposed to do, that he didn't replace the baffles. So the next annual inspection a year later he asked the defendant were there baffles in that tower, and defendant said yes.

Now defense now tries to claim that it didn't happen, that he misremembered, that he was making this up. But one thing he was clear about throughout his testimony, he never told Mr. Kamholz to operate that tower without baffles.

And this was a continual theme about misremembering that Mr. Personius put forth. When Kamholz said something that was incriminating, he claimed it wasn't clear what Mr. Kamholz said. If someone remembered something that was incriminating about Mr. Kamholz, he said they misunderstood, or it didn't happen. So Miss Hamre didn't hear Mr. Kamholz say there were no pressure relief valves in the system. And Mr. Foersch didn't hear the defendant say yes, there were baffles in the tower. Does that make really a lot of common sense to you?

Looking back now, of course, Mr. Foersch was asked on the stand, knowing that he had been misled by Mr. Kamholz, that maybe in his heart of hearts he knew that Kamholz may not have replaced the baffles. Well, looking back like that, he had to reflect, and he had to admit maybe that was true. But that made no difference, because he never told the defendant that he could do it. There was nothing for Mr. Kamholz to rely upon. And he knew that Mr. Foersch did not have the authority to change the permit.

And if the -- if Mr. Kamholz was really relying upon those conversations with Foersch, why did the

defendant state in the HAP report -- can I have 131.2-10 please again?

Why does he state again that there are baffles in the tower in the HAP report six years after the baffles were removed? Why did he put in his application for renewal of his Title V permit in 2006 that there were baffles in the east quench tower? Was he relying on Mr. Foersch's authority? If he was, why didn't he put it in these documents?

Again, it's not because he relied on Mr. Foersch. He relied on Mr. Foersch not finding out, not getting caught. The fact that
Mr. Foersch, knowing Mr. Kamholz gave him a break and give him a warning, put the baffles in rather than write out a NOV, should be held against
Mr. Foersch that somehow now the defendant was relying upon him not to follow-up? Is that really what this is about? Is that really relying on Mr. Foersch, or is that relying on Mr. Foersch not finding out? There's a difference there.

He wasn't relying on Mr. Foersch giving him the authority, because if he did he would have represented that. On more than one occasion that he had, every compliance report, every year that he submitted to the DEC, baffles in the east quench

tower. In the HAP report, baffles in the east quench tower. In the Title V renewal, baffles in the east quench tower. Does that sound like he was relying on Mr. Foersch, or was he relying on not getting caught? Common sense tells you what the answer to that is.

Now, also this question about why didn't we call Mr. Foersch, why didn't we call Mr. Fisher, why didn't we call Miss Webster? Well, the government decides how it can prove its case, and I submit to you the government proved its case by simply showing what are the permit conditions and through the testimony of the employees, what were the conditions at the plant. That's it. That's the violation.

We don't have to call -- we didn't call

Mr. Foersch. We didn't call any air inspector and

we didn't call Mr. Fisher, we called the inspector

that was there at the time of the time period from

which the indictment was charged. Okay. Consider

how long this case would have been if we called

every inspector that came in that went to Tonawanda

Coke Corporation. We have to make a decision

what's going to be efficient, what's going to keep

your attention, and that's our decision.

Let's -- since I mentioned Mr. Corbett, let's move over to Counts 18 and 19. Those are the disposal charges. Now, there is a lot Mr. Linsin said was based upon what Miss Williams told you. I would ask you to recall my attempts to ask

Miss Williams a simple yes or no question and what the answers were like. Usually 15, 20 minutes later I got to ask my next question.

Now, it's your recollection that counts, but remember I asked her your resume indicates that you testified 40 times in the last 25 years, 40 times -- over 40 times, excuse me, in the last 25 years. And her response was I haven't bothered to count them. Okay.

Now it's up to you to consider motivations.

It's up to you to figure out if she was being evasive when I was trying to ask her questions.

But you can consider is Miss Williams a professional witness, paid to provide the answers a company pays her to get? If they want an opinion, do they pay her to come up with that opinion? So is it a surprise that Miss Williams' testimony disagreed with every DEC, every EPA expert, even, Mr. Corbett, the RCRA inspector? Her testimony disagreed with all of them.

And then she gives her opinion as to what the RCRA inspectors were doing out at Tonawanda Coke. This is a woman who never conducted a RCRA inspection, never inspected a coke production plant, never saw hazardous waste recycled, never went to Tonawanda Coke Corporation. And she's going to tell us her opinion as to what the inspectors were doing when they were out there doing a RCRA inspection. Does that make any common sense to you?

But let's compare what the defendants are saying now with what the defense actually did during this time period. Now, if you recall, defendants seem to always try to say the pad was built for storage. Really, let's see, and think about that. You can consider if the defendant built that pad to mix hazardous waste properly and then they choose not to use the pad, are they knowingly violating the law? Consider that. And let's look at this.

First of all, we know in 1992 the K087 recycling laws are passed, the regulations which say you can recycle this, you don't have to pay for disposal of your K087 anymore. You can recycle it into your coke ovens as long as it isn't land

disposed, as long as it doesn't hit the ground.

Well, coincidentally Tonawanda Coke in 1994

puts in a concrete pad with walls on it that

curiously enough looks like a mixing pad where it's

legal to recycle your hazardous waste by mixing it

on that pad and transferring it over to the ovens

without it touching the ground. All right.

Now if you recall Mr. Ohar's testimony, Mr.

Ohar was the engineer who was there when the pad
was installed. And what was the first thing they
did at that pad? They held a demonstration mixing
K087 waste with coal on the pad. That's what they
did. They didn't demonstrate storage. They
demonstrated mixing of K087 waste on the pad, and
then they took a crane and they put it over on to
the belt that goes to the ovens. And it did not
hit the ground. No land disposal. A legal form of
recycling. Okay.

Is that consistent with putting that pad in just for storage? Is that consistent with the defendants' argument that mixing of K087 and coal on the coal piles is appropriate? Now, again, it's your recollection, not mine, but if you recall testimony from Mr. Snyder and Mr. Rogers about the installation of a pug mill.

Can we have Exhibit 3.02 please?

Do you remember this? The pug mill is over here. I'm a little off. That's a tree. But close enough to the pug mill. What was the purpose of the pug mill? Do you remember? It was to mix the K087 sludge on the pad and go up that ramp and on to -- if you look behind -- on to that belt back there to the coke ovens. That was the purpose of that. Is that consistent with storage? Is that why the pad was there, for storage? Why put the pug mill there?

Now, can I have 3.03 please?

I just want to show you there's the pad with the rain runoff contained on the pad. That's the purpose of the pad, to prevent lateral distribution of contamination. And what happens is if you mix the sludge and the coal with that, that all gets thrown back into the coke oven.

Now, what Mr. Snyder and Mr. Rogers said was the pug mill didn't work. It kept breaking down.

It spilled things. So, the defendants had a choice at that point. And that is the crucial issue here.

They had the choice, do they spend more money, more time mixing it on the pad and finding a way to get it to the coke ovens without it hitting the ground,

or do they go back to their old ways and put it back on the coal piles, knowing full well that it's going to hit the ground, knowing full well that they have a legal way of doing it on that pad and choosing to go and do it illegally. And it was just a matter of saving time, saving money.

They weren't relying on inspectors to put it on that pile, coal pile. That had nothing to do with it. They weren't relying on Miss Williams' concepts of land based units that emerged in 2008. That had nothing do with it. They weren't relying on this was the first step of recycling, therefore we don't need land disposal. No. They had a pad. They knew how to do it. They chose to do it differently. They chose to save money, save time, just dump it on the pad. Just dump it off the pad on the coal piles. Mix it directly there.

And the testimony shows there's no controls when they did that, that the constituents can go anywhere. And Mr. Snyder and Mr. Heukrath testified that when it rained, whatever was on that coal pile washed down into those ditches and went — left the coal piles and eventually made its way through ditches down to the Niagara River.

Does that sound like land disposal to you,

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where a constituent may enter the environment?

Doesn't even have to "shall enter the environment".

May enter the environment.

Then this argument about where does the ground Apparently if you went home and sprayed -and put coal on your lawn and you walked on it, you weren't walking on the ground now, you're walking on coal. Well, if we follow that, if you put grass seed on the ground and you walk on the ground, you're not walking on the ground, you're walking on grass seed. Does that make any sense to you? Where does the ground start? According to the defense it's 3 feet below the surface, then mentioned some sort of clay lens that went 50 feet. Does that count or doesn't it count? Does it go further down? Are we talking about the ground starting about 53 feet below the surface of the Does that make any sense to you? was on the ground, and you're walking on it, that's the ground. The same way if you're walking on the sand, the sand is the ground. There's no distinction between them.

And really the point is out of all of that, if you put it on the ground in that fashion, if you put it on the pile on a coal field, are you

containing it? Are you preventing the constituents from migrating out into the environment? And the answer is they didn't. By doing that, they knowingly disposed of hazardous waste.

Now I want to talk about active management kind of quickly. Trying to make this as quick as I can. With respect to Count 17 there is this testimony from Mrs. Williams regarding the issue of active management. There is the testimony from Mr. Flax about active management. It's very simple. Just listen to the definition of the Judge as to what active management is, okay? And your recollection counts, not mine.

But do you recall testimony of Mr. Rogers? He stated that when he first got to that area it was spread out over a 200-by-200 foot area, and it was things getting stuck in this. Okay. And that over time that material got mixed at least twice with coke breeze and heavy equipment ran over it, and it moved the entire material over to the area between the two tanks, and moved it all the way over there, and now had all this stuff on top of it, and then was accidently set on fire. And on top of that it was material leaked out into it.

Now, I wonder if I could have Exhibit 125.02.

Make it 125.01. There we go. Okay.

So, this is the site before the fire -- or after the fire. And this is what it looked like then.

Can we go to 3.04? Okay.

There's the tank on the right. And if you can see, it's leaking. It's coming out. It's being added to the material. Oh, by the way -- can we blow up this part right here? Notice this is the stuff they said well, we're putting this stuff down as road -- as part of the road, that it's impermeable. It doesn't prevent the spread of anything. Does that look impermeable to you? There's things growing in it. The water percolates down, and there's things growing in it. This is not impervious pad. This is not coal, coke breeze making it impossible for material to spreed.

Can I have Exhibit 136.02? Okay.

So this is the final result of active management or not active management. You can decide if this material that started out in a 200-200-foot area somewhere beyond this photograph and was pushed into this area and mixed and contributed to by the stuff in the tanks. You can decide that for yourselves. Was this material --

when it was originally placed in that 200-and-200-foot area, was that material disturbed? You can decide that. And you don't need any experts to figure that one out.

I just want to comment about something. If you notice, there is a partial wall there left from the storage tank.

And can we go back to 125.03 please? Make that 125.02. Sorry.

There are those tanks, the same tanks back here, okay? And then after the fire if you recall there was testimony that material leaked.

Can I put that 125.02 again? Sorry.

After the fire they said they walked around, and if you see, you can see that there's water there, so they really can't tell from that picture if anything leaked or not if it had come out underneath. And remember those tanks in the back.

Now, can I have Exhibit 3.06?

Remember this photograph? Mr. Corbett testified that this material that looked like it was solid was really like quicksand, that the material had leaked out, and it leaked out all the way over to those two tanks in the background.

Let's see if I can find -- 125.04 again. No,

I'm sorry. 125.02. There we go.

There are the other two towers. So that material leaked from behind and out that way.

THE COURT: This is 125.01.

MR. PIAGGIONE: Thank you for that correction, your Honor. And if I could go to 136.06, please.

Remember there was a partial wall? Well, that's where they took the samples of this material as it leaked. There was a trail that went from there to those two tanks in the back. It leaked. There's evidence it leaked.

Now, lets talk about the west tower, the west quench tower. Now the defense tries to make this controversy over the west quench tower. They say that because the EPA and the DEC differed over the baffles in the west tower going forward in November of 2009 forward.

Is that another call coming in, your Honor?

THE COURT: It was. Sorry.

MR. PIAGGIONE: Because the EPA and DEC got into a controversy over how they should have baffles going forward from November 2009, somehow someway that means the defendants can't be prosecuted for not having baffles in the tower

before 2009. Before November of 2009. In other words, if the defendants used it more than 10 percent of the time before 2009, they are innocent, or being dealt with unfairly, because once they found out they were using it, once they found they were using it more ten percent, and once it was determined they needed baffles in that tower, going forward they were innocent for having violated their exemption looking backward. That makes no sense.

The government from its opening statement said if the defendants were using the west quench tower more than 10 percent of the time, it needed baffles. So what does it matter if after November of 2009, after the period that's charged in the indictment, the EPA and the DEC decide they have to have baffles in the tower? If they wanted to fight that, they can go and fight that with the EPA and DEC. It has nothing to do with this case. It's irrelevant.

And with respect to how often it was used, do you remember the testimony of the employees and the ex-employees were, when they were working -- when they first started working there, and it was more than just Mr. Hoffmann, it was Mr. Gonzalez, it was

Mr. Kambat, people who said their work depended upon which tower was being used. They worked on the wharf or they worked on the hot car for a while, the towers were used alternatively.

Mr. Heukrath said he started in 1993 said the towers were used alternatively.

In fact, in 2008 when the west quench tower comes back online, Mr. Kamholz tells him the west quench tower should be used 10 percent of the time. That's the first time Mr. Heukrath even hears about 10 percent of the time. The first time.

So what happened before that? Think about it. The evidence is people remember — they didn't sit there and count, this is true. But that's not how people remember things like this. They remember them by events. If I was drawing an analogy, if you went out to eat at a restaurant with your friends, and you came back and you felt that the food was good but it was expensive. Several years later you remember that the restaurant was expensive. You're not going to remember what exactly you paid for it, what was your bill. But you're going to remember it was expensive.

Well, the same way all the testimony is consistent, the towers were used alternatively.

Not 10 percent of the time, not rarely.

Alternatively. That's how they remember things.

You remember by events, impressions you get. And clearly Mr. Gonzalez was the only one who said -- let me say Mr. Heukrath said when Kamholz told him the towers should only be used 10 percent of the time, he also said he wasn't even sure if that instruction was followed thereafter. That was his testimony. He did not know.

So if you think about Mr. Gonzalez, he was the one who is still on the battery, still working there, 19 years on the battery. And he said for every eight ovens pushed, there has to be one or two that go to the west quench tower. And we added it up. 24 pushes that's -- 2.4 is 10 percent.

Minimum three went to the west quench tower. And as high as six went to west quench tower. That's still more than 10 percent.

Now there is this question about when the west quench tower was down, and depending on who you heard, it went from six months to two years. But that's not five years. That's five counts here.

Mr. Heukrath pinpoints -- he's the only one pinpoints the time that the tower was down to 2008.

You can decide based upon that information which

counts apply, which counts may not apply. That's a question of fact for you. But the simple fact of the matter is six months to two years doesn't equal five years.

I want to talk about the obstruction charge before I finish up. Now, first of all,

Mr. Personius again claims it was never clear what

Mr. Kamholz said to Mr. Cahill. But let's look at these arguments in context. He keeps saying that we should put it in entire context, and I agree we should.

First of all, Mr. Kamholz receives a letter from the EPA that there was an inspection coming. He gets the letter, not Mr. Cahill. Mr. Kamholz is responsible for environmental compliance, not Mr. Cahill. Mr. Kamholz had the responsibility to get a permit for the bleeder valve, not Mr. Cahill. So when Mr. Kamholz took Cahill through the by-products area looking for violations to clean up — it wasn't the other way around. It wasn't Mr. Cahill. It was Mr. Kamholz pointing out to Cahill you've got to do that, you've got to clean up that. If Mr. Kamholz didn't think the bleeder valve was an issue, didn't think it was a violation, why say anything? If he thought that

was perfectly all right, that's not like clean up that oil spill. It's, that's a problem. Don't have that going off when they're here.

Now, Mr. Personius tries to claim well there's four different versions of it. Don't have that going off when they're here. Don't have that going off. Don't go having that go off during the -- it's all basically the same thing, isn't it?

You're trying to recall verbatim what someone said to you four years ago.

And consider Mr. Cahill's stress testifying here at that time. He's testifying against his life-long employer. Think about that. And if he gets something a little off, maybe he would be a little nervous about it.

But if Mr. Kamholz didn't think it was a violation, why did he even point it out to Mr. Cahill? Does that make any sense to you? Why he would do that, unless he thought it was a problem? And if Mr. Kamholz didn't think it was a violation, why did he tell Miss Hamre and the other inspectors that there was no bleeder valve in the by-product area? And my recollection, and yours is the one that counts, Mr. Personius has a different version of this. Mr. Kamholz told the inspectors

when they first saw it going off, you'll have to speak to the by-products manager. He didn't say that's steam, that's a pressure relief valve. He didn't say anything like that.

Miss Hamre's testimony, if you recall it, was she was looking down, she saw a cloud, they turned around, she pointed it out to Mr. Garing.

Mr. Garing asked Mr. Kamholz what is that. And he says you'll have to talk to the by-products manager. He didn't say that's steam. He didn't say that's a pressure relief valve. He said you have to go talk to Cahill. Pat Cahill.

Now, did he know what it was? We know from the testimony that he did. We know that more than one person spoke to him about the bleeder valve over the years. We also know, although Mr. Cahill doesn't remember him there that often, that Mr. Rogers remembers that he was there frequently in the by-products area. That was his testimony.

There was only one reason why Mr. Kamholz told Cahill that can't happen. It was to hide it.

Don't let it be seen during the inspection. And when he did that, he obstructed the EPA's inspection attempt to find benzene sources coming from Tonawanda Coke Corporation. And as Paul

Harvey said, that's the rest of that story.

Now, there's the testimony that Kamholz said he didn't discuss it afterwards. And this is something that Mr. Personius put forth as something you should consider, the fact that he never mentioned it again. Well, you can also consider it that perhaps Mr. Kamholz was now trying to distance himself from Pat Cahill, because Pat Cahill was the by-products manager. And now we had a violation in the by-products area that the EPA had discovered.

Remember Mr. Kamholz's response to the 114 questionnaire? He answered it about the pressure relief valve saying based upon P. Cahill, that's how he prefaced it. He was putting the blame on Pat Cahill. Yet he admits -- Mr. Personius admits that Pat Cahill never spoke to Mr. Kamholz about the bleeder valve after it was discovered. So he wasn't supplying that information in that questionnaire. Yet Mr. Kamholz put it down, according to -- or by P. Cahill, as if he was relying upon Mr. Cahill for the answers that he put down. The other part of that is so the DEC's response was turn that pressure up so it doesn't go Let's figure out what we've got here before we do something.

And this other argument about Mr. Carlacci, whether or not he had a mask on or not, what Mr. Carlacci remembers is he put the mask to his face when they were going past that area. That's all he remembers. He wasn't saying that he was carrying this gas mask around all the time or not. He wasn't passing judgment on that. It was interesting he brought it along with him since they indicated they weren't going to the battery where you need it. They were going to go look at the by-products area where supposedly you don't need it.

Now, there's some other things that we might mention. The question about Mr. Kamholz saying about beehives. What's the importance about beehives? According to Mr. Personius, Mr. Brossack also doesn't remember what he heard when he said it, that we just had a beehive for 45 minutes, and Mr. Kamholz responded beehives only last ten minutes. Well, there is a reason for that.

If you look at the Title V permit condition 75D it says when there is a beehive, it has to be reported. You have to tell the DEC or the EPA. So if they're going to tell the DEC or the EPA they had a 45 minute beehive, that would be a violation.

So, yes, Mr. Brossack could not read
Mr. Kamholz's mind, but did he have to? Is that
what happens in the real world? If someone said to
you we just had a beehive for 45 minutes, and he
says beehives only last ten minutes, what is the
message you're getting? Use your common sense. He
doesn't have to read his mind. He doesn't have to
say to Mr. Kamholz oh, you mean I should only put
it in the book at ten minutes, is that what you're
saying, Mr. Kamholz? That's not how it works in
the real world. Everyone is talking in context of
their everyday life. And they're not going to
spell out everything that's said.

You know a trial is a search for the truth.

And it's been that way for over 200 years. Now you saw all the government witnesses up here. They were people who were nervous. Remember Mr. Rogers had broken out in hives. Mr. Gonzalez when he tried to drink water was like a human quench tower. I mean, you have to consider it took a great deal of courage for them to go forward and speak here.

And what did the defense do? They subjected these witnesses to a barrage of relentless questions, parsing words, tenses, designed to confuse the witness. Is that really a search for

the truth? And how many of you would have made a mistake if you were subject to that type of cross-examination?

You might consider that that was not a search for the truth, but a search to create mistakes that they can now represent to you well, on cross so and so said this, so and so said that. You heard each witness. You heard their entire testimony. You use your common sense, and you won't be fooled.

You know, Abraham Lincoln is in the news a lot lately. There is a movie about him. Perhaps you saw it. He had this famous saying, among many, about fooling the people. And that saying has kind have been narrowed down and changed over time. It basically comes down to this almost oriental saying. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.

The defendants managed to fool the DEC and the system designed to protect the environment once.

The defendants should not be permitted to fool the system designed to protect the environment again.

Accordingly, I ask you to live up to your responsibility as jurors and find the defendants guilty of the 19 counts in this indictment. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Piaggione, thank you.

Okay, ladies and gentlemen, we're getting closer and closer and closer to what you have to do, and that is resolve the fact issues that you've heard argument about over the course of the last two days. Before we do that though we think you should be fortified, and so we're going to break for lunch, and we'll have you back here at 2:30 we'll start again, but that will be with my instructions on the law to you. Okay. No more arguments.

Once we complete my instructions to you -- it's going to take some time, so whatever you eat make sure that it's enlightening in terms of your ability to spend some time with me. Make sure you don't eat too heavy so you start dozing off. I want you to stay alert as best you can. Because, you know, and nobody's making light of anything here. This is very serious business, so -- it is important that you understand my charge as a totality, of the instruction in the law to apply to this case. Don't really talk about it. Keep, you know, enjoy the time that you back here at 2:30.

Okay. Thank you very much. You've been terrific. Appreciate it.

(Jury excused from the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Thank you. See you back here at 2:30.

(Lunch recess was taken.)

(Jury not present in the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Okay. The attorneys and the parties are back present. I am ready to begin.

I'll have the jury brought in in short order. What I -- just for your information, two things. One, I am going to start with charge number 35, which is the indictment is not evidence. I may have delivered that charge before, but I think -- I did not?

MR. LINSIN: No. I thought my recollection, your Honor, is you stopped just before that, because it seemed to be a logical place to begin with before you start reading the charge.

THE COURT: So I will start with that.

And for your information, with respect to the special verdict form, in my judgment, I'm going to let the verdict form stand as prepared. I'm not going to add the special verdict form component to

the verdict form itself for a number of reasons, including the fact that I think the charge that I will be giving with respect to entrapment by estoppel is a strong charge. I think from the jury's standpoint, as engaged as they are, it will not lose its impact by virtue of the strength of the charge. It's not going to be any more important or less important than anything else in the charge, but I think the jury will get it.

I think there are some issues with respect to the extent or the appropriateness of the proof as to each individual count such that including the language on each verdict sheet that applies to each count of the indictment might not be the appropriate way to go. And, you know, I did raise this matter sua sponte in a sense, although it certainly differs from, you know, the case that I reviewed. But, I think in the totality, it still winds up as the fairest of approaches is to leave this verdict form as a general verdict form and not a special verdict form, and that will be my decision on that. So I just wanted you to know before I get into charging the jury.

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, could I ask about two issues then? We accept your ruling obviously.

But with respect to the unanimity instruction on the issue of active management for Count 17, can I inquire how the Court intends to address that issue?

THE COURT: You mean in terms of asking for a jury response with respect to active management?

MR. LINSIN: A confirmation, your Honor, that the jurors -- it is one thing to provide a general unanimity requiring unanimity on every element and on every count.

THE COURT: Yeah. I don't believe it's necessary to do anything more than the elemental approach that we're -- for that particular count. And I think there is the prevailing presumption that the jury will follow my instructions with respect to unanimity, so I don't think there's anything more that really has to be done.

MR. LINSIN: The second point I wanted to inquire about, your Honor, in the draft instructions -- draft charges that were circulated, when you again reference the entrapment by estoppel defense toward the end of your charge -- it would be what was originally -- I don't know what the new number is, but originally draft charge 66 there was

an indication in that draft charge that it was applicable to Counts 17, 18 and 19. You referenced the earlier detailed discussion of the defense and simply remind the jury that it applies to these remaining counts.

I guess my threshold question there is, does the Court intend to retain that language in what at least was draft charge 66? As I'm looking at that original draft charge, it is at the end of the second paragraph -- I'm sorry, the third paragraph in that draft charge.

mean, it's still the same. It's draft -- or it's still 66. I think it's going to be on page 102 I think when we get this finalized. But the way I have it prepared is that I will reference that. Initially the instruction related to Counts 1 through 15, but I will reference the fact that to be included will be Counts 17 through 19 as well. So that will take care of all of the counts.

MR. LINSIN: All right. Thank you.

THE COURT: There's more embellishing language that surrounds that, but I've broken it down into two separate sections.

MR. LINSIN: All right.

1 MR. PERSONIUS: Judge, I don't -- and I'm 2 not complaining. I just want to make sure I 3 haven't missed something. I don't have a copy of the current version of what's left of the charge. 4 5 Are we not supposed to have it? 6 THE COURT: No, you should have it. 7 MR. LINSIN: No, I don't have it either. 8 THE COURT: You don't? Okay. 9 LAW CLERK: They don't get it. I can make 10 copies of it. 11 THE COURT: It would helpful --12 MR. LINSIN: It would be helpful to be 13 able to follow along and make sure, if we're going 14 to ask whether we object or not at the conclusion 15 whether it's faithful to the text we understand. 16 THE COURT: That's my fault. We did make 17 changes. LAW CLERK: Your practice is counsel does 18 19 not get a copy of the final charge. I can do it if 20 you want me to do it. 21 THE COURT: We made the changes though. 22 You have the draft charge, right? 23 MR. LINSIN: We have the draft charge. 24 The Court had indicated yesterday that things were

going to be repaginated. There were additional

1 charges made. We got some of the draft charges at 2 the end of the day yesterday, but --3 THE COURT: Okay. Well, yeah, we'll do 4 Let's get it prepared. It's my fault. it. 5 MR. PERSONIUS: That's all right, Judge. 6 THE COURT: Give my a couple of minutes. 7 MR. PERSONIUS: Sorry. 8 THE COURT: Thank you, your Honor. 9 MR. LINSIN: Thank you, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Give me a couple of minutes 11 and we'll get that done. 12 (Short recess was taken.) 13 (Jury not present in the courtroom.) 14 THE COURT: Okay. We are reconvened. 15 There is a question with respect to an email 16 exchange? 17 MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, there is. 18 apologize to the Court for not more thoroughly 19 reviewing this. Mr. Mango is correct and I now 20 have in front of me a copy of an email that he sent 21 to the Court's law clerk at 6:38 p.m. last evening 22 regarding these definitions. I erroneously 23 presumed that Mr. Mango, pursuant to our discussion 24 yesterday, would have transmitted to the Court a

full text of the definitions that we discussed and

agreed upon yesterday.

I now realize in reviewing this that he has edited these definitions. He has left out significant portions that, in his judgment, he deemed irrelevant. He has adopted another regulation, and I'm not quite certain how.

I fault myself, your Honor, for not more carefully looking at this. But I presumed, mistakenly, that we would be dealing with, and I think we need to be dealing with, an unedited, unmassaged definition straight from the regulations, and that's not what this email transmitted.

THE COURT: And we just took what was given to us and incorporated that into the charge.

MR. LINSIN: So I do apologize for not observing this before, your Honor. I didn't think it was going to be necessary.

MR. MANGO: Your Honor, if I could respond. I did put -- I didn't change any of the definitions. I left out parts that really have no bearing. For example, in modification this (aq) in 6 NYCRR 200.1(aq) Modification is about 10, 12 different -- 12 lines. And I don't think there's any real dispute between the parties that what I've

included is the only relevant portion in this case.

I could, if you want, I could go back and cut and paste and send the Court the full definitions. You could take a look at them and make that call. I didn't think this was going to be an issue, your Honor.

It was not my intention to, you know, try to mislead defense counsel or the Court, and I absolutely did not try to do that. I tried to keep the definitions in a very simple and clear manner so that you wouldn't have to read 12 lines of irrelevant text for modification.

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, again, I fault myself for not being clearer on this when I first walked in the courtroom today. I don't have my file with me that has the actual text of these definitions. I would -- before I could agree to editing or deleting text that Mr. Mango is representing is irrelevant, I would need, on behalf of my client, to look at the actual text. I confess I should have done it last evening, and I just did not. I have a file back in my hotel room, but I don't have it with me.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LINSIN: I apologize, your Honor.

1 THE COURT: Get the full text, please, of 2 the definitions. 3 MR. MANGO: I'll go email them to the 4 parties right now, your Honor. 5 MR. LINSIN: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: And then --6 7 MR. MANGO: That should take me 15 8 minutes. 9 THE COURT: You haven't seen the weather 10 conditions outside? 11 MR. MANGO: There is a computer on the 12 third floor, so I'm going to go use that. I have 13 it electronically, and I can submit it. THE COURT: If would do that, please, that 14 would be helpful, and notify me when you're ready. 15 16 Chris, if you tell the jury it's going to be a 17 little while yet before we get started, please, 18 with apologies, okay? 19 Okay. 20 MR. MANGO: Thank you, your Honor. 21 MR. LINSIN: Thank you your Honor. 22 (Short recess was taken.) 23 (Jury not present in the courtroom.) 24 THE COURT: Okay. We are again 25 reassembled. The attorneys and parties are back

present. Where do we stand as far as definitions are concerned?

MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, again I apologize to the Court for bringing this up at this point, but Mr. Mango has now sent, I believe, to the Court and to the defense the full text of these definitions, which is what we had understood was going to be included and instructed on. We believe for a number of reasons with respect to each of these definitions — some of them I should say were complete in Mr. Mango's email, and obviously those I believe should stand. But for the ones that were not complete, we believe the complete text of the definition as contained in the regulations should be incorporated.

I understand that one or two of them are a bit more lengthy, but that is -- we believe there's important language in there. That's what we had understood was going to be included, and we would ask simply that the full text be included rather than the abbreviated version that was circulated to the Court and to the parties last night.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you -- have you specifically identified which ones --

MR. LINSIN: Yes. Let me -- I apologize

for scrolling through as I'm talking, your Honor, but the definition of "source" needs to be amended. That is incomplete in the original email. The definition of "point" we believe was complete as transmitted last evening, and therefore we don't think any change it necessary there.

THE COURT: What I have is "emission point" right, not just "point"?

MR. LINSIN: I'm sorry, "emission point," yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LINSIN: And the definition that is contained in the draft charge number 44, which your clerk just passed out, we believe captures the entire language of the regulations, so we are fine with that. The term "construction", however, is abbreviated in this draft version, and we believe needs to be amended. The term "modification" is substantially abbreviated, and we believe needs to be amended, and the term "process" is correct and complete.

THE COURT: Okay. So --

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ LINSIN: So source, construction, and modification.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So just

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going back to the email, okay, for a second, where
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      you have Mr. Mango addressing Andrew, the first
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      definition is "emission source". At the bottom of
 4
      the email. Are we together on that?
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          Mr. Linsin, do you have the email?
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               MR. LINSIN: The email that was just sent,
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      your Honor, is that the email --
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               THE COURT: No, the one from last night.
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               MR. LINSIN: The one from last evening.
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               THE COURT: Yes.
               MR. LINSIN: The first definition on that
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      email is "emission source".
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               THE COURT: Then it has in paren small F.
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               MR. LINSIN: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Is that the full
16
      definition?
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               MR. LINSIN: That is the full definition,
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      yes.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Likewise, for
20
      "modification" it's on the next page of the email.
21
      There's "modification" that follows in paren aq, do
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      you see that?
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               MR. LINSIN: We passed over
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      "construction", your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Well, okay. "Construction" is
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1 nine, paren nine. 2 MR. LINSIN: Correct. THE COURT: That's full definition? 3 4 MR. LINSIN: That's full definition, yes. 5 THE COURT: Okay. And then modification 6 is in paren aq. 7 MR. LINSIN: Correct. 8 THE COURT: Full definition all the why 9 through in paren number two? 10 MR. LINSIN: Yes, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Okay. That's what you want 12 included? 13 MR. LINSIN: Yes. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Well, what I believe I 15 will do is just -- I mean, I'd like to get started, 16 so I'm going to read off of the email. In the 17 meantime Andrew will be adding those definitions to 18 charge number 44. 19 MR. LINSIN: All right. That's fine, your 20 Honor. 21 THE COURT: And then once he's integrated 22 all of that in, everything else will fall into 23 place. He'll bring that out for you to follow 24 along.

MR. LINSIN: Thank you very much, your

1 Honor. THE COURT: Andrew, does that work? 2 3 LAW CLERK: Sure. Can I just ask you a 4 question? 5 (Discussion off the record.) THE COURT: In the definitions there's --6 7 well, let's work with "modification" just for the 8 moment. When you get to the paren numbers 1 and 2, 9 there's the pursuant to 40 CFR Part 52.21. Then 10 you drop down to 2, it's 40 CFR Part 52.21. Do you 11 want that you included in, the "pursuant to" 12 language? Because -- well, no, not because. 13 MR. LINSIN: Your Honor, I believe we could safely end that at 1975. 14 15 THE COURT: Right. And then in 2, we 16 could end it after "issued," period, instead of 17 referencing under 40 CFR --18 MR. LINSIN: Yes, I believe -- I am 19 comfortable with that too, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Okay. And then I think that's 21 pretty much it. Okay. 22 Mr. Mango, that works? 23 MR. MANGO: Yes, your Honor. Yes, 24 whatever the Court wants to do or defense requests.

Again, I was not trying to do anything so --

4162 LAW CLERK: Emission source sub F, the third line has "as defined in Part 203 of this title." Do you want to end it at contamination? MR. MANGO: I think it's probably safe to take that out as well. They've heard it. defer to counsel. MR. LINSIN: You know, it may be cleaner to simply put a period after the words "cleaning device". Because I think we would all agree that the exception that is captured in that last clause is not an issue here. MR. MANGO: That's agreed, your Honor. THE COURT: That's okay? 14 MR. MANGO: That's agreed. THE COURT: Okay. Andrew, anything else?

> LAW CLERK: That's it. I'll bring out charges 1 through 43, and then I'll bring the rest.

> THE COURT: Okay. You can follow along. It will be a little disjointed, but I think it's --I'm going to take my time. I'm hoping we can finish up the charge this afternoon. But, I mean, actually I can only go until about 5:30, so that's why I want to get started. Okay.

All right, Andrew, whatever you have to do.

MR. LINSIN: The last sentence -- I'm

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sorry, your Honor. The last sentence though after that part we just redacted from "emission source" the last sentence will be retained in that definition, yes?

THE COURT: Yes, where a process through the end?

MR. LINSIN: Exactly.

THE COURT: Okay. Yes.

MR. LINSIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. The other thing is where we break down the counts in the charge, 1 through 5, 6 through 10, and then 11 through 15, and 16, and then 17 through 19 I'm going to just read a summary rather than each individual count and let the jury know that they will be given the indictment so that they can get into the specifics of Count 1, Count 2, et cetera.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ LINSIN: We have no problem with that, your Honor.

MR. PERSONIUS: Very acceptable.

THE COURT: By the time -- Mr. Mango?

MR. MANGO: That's fine.

THE COURT: Because by the time we'd get through reading each one of the counts, the jury would be spent I think. So, I think that's

probably a good way of proceeding. Okay.

All right. Chris, if you would bring the jury out, please?

(Jury seated.)

THE COURT: I don't know how much lengthier a lunch break we can give you, but I hope you're ready. If you would sit down, please.

Thank you for coming back. As you can see, the attorneys and the parties are back present.

And, again, I apologize for the delay, but it sometimes take us a little bit of time to get ready for you, and in the end it saves a lot of time.

So, you know, I'm going to work with you for the next couple of hours, all right, I think. And if I can do it a little quicker than that, I hope that will work. But, you know, only time will tell.

And it's important, but remember what I said to you at the outset that no part -- no any one part of the instruction that I give to you is any more or less important than any other part. So it's the totality of what I will be telling you that comprises the law, the total law, that applies to this case, not any one part. But we're going to talk in terms of grouping of counts of the indictment. I think almost everything that you are

familiar with -- and a lot of this you will have heard before, but it's our hope that it will register with you in a way that will be constructive and that will be helping you get to resolving the fact issues in this case.

I'll proceed much like we did when I gave you the preliminary charge the other day. To be honest with you, I'm losing track of days. I don't think it was -- was it yesterday?

MR. MANGO: Two days ago.

THE COURT: Two days ago. All right. We already have a dispute. You have to resolve the fact issue when you did get that charge from me, among others. Okay.

Serious business, right? I mean, we can't repeat that enough. So, I've given you the preliminary instructions, and we're now going to turn to the charges and a discussion of those against the two defendants in this case as contained in the indictment. And just so you know, we're going give you the indictment itself, so you're going to have that document to work with.

And I want to remind you in that regard that that document is just a notice document. It's not evidence, and what it does is describe the charges

that are made against the defendants. And when I say that, what I mean is that it is an accusation that each of the defendants committed what is charged in the 19 counts of that particular indictment.

But, as you know -- and you've heard many times you are not to consider it as any evidence whatsoever of the guilt of the defendants in this case. And in reaching the determination of whether the government has proved the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, you may consider only the evidence introduced or the lack of evidence.

Now let me group those charges for you.

Charges are counts, synonomous, right? One through five of the indictment charge the defendants, both, with violating the Clean Air Act by operating a source of air pollution in violation of a permit issued under Title V of the Clean Air Act by emitting coke oven gas from an unpermitted emission source. Okay. Those are the first five counts.

Now, when you get to the indictment you'll have each count, and they'll read similarly, but you have to look at it carefully in terms of the content of each count. So I'm not going to read all five counts at this point.

What I will do is then go to the next grouping of charges or counts, and that is 6 through 10, and that too charges crimes under the Clean Air Act.

And each of the defendants is charged with violating the Clean Air Act by operating a source of air pollution in violation of a permit issued under Title V of the Clean Air Act by operating the western quench towers -- that's quench tower number 1 -- without baffles. And then the indictment will take you through Counts 6 through 10.

The next grouping is Counts 11 through 15 also involving the Clean Air Act. And if you remember, the last three counts deal with the RCRA statute. But 11 through 15 charge the same defendants with violating the Clean Air Act by operating a source of air pollution in violation of a permit issued under Title V of the Clean Air Act by operating the eastern quench tower — and as you know, the eastern quench tower is number 2, at least that's the proof that has been presented to you — without baffles. Okay. That's Counts 11 through 15.

Now, Count 16 is the count that you heard -okay. We'll get to Count 16 down the road a little
bit. And then, you know, we're going to talk about
Counts 17 through 19 as well. But we're going stay

with the Clean Air Act at this point in time. I think it will make more sense to you before we get to the obstruction of justice count, and then we get to the RCRA count.

So let me tell you about the Clean Air Act, and, I mean, just so you know, under the law it's 42 United States Code, Section 7413(c)(1). But the purpose of that statute is this: The Clean Air Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder is a comprehensive air pollution control statute that reflects the congressional purpose — the purpose of Congress — to protect and enhance the quality of the nation's air resources. And that's the charge of the prosecutors in this office to accomplish the enforcement of the Clean Air Act pursuant to the purpose of the statute.

Now, let's talk about elements, because you've been, in a way, trained or at least exposed to the terminology elements of each of the counts in the indictment. And each has to be satisfied by the government beyond a reasonable doubt. And if the government fails with respect to any one, you cannot convict. If it does prove each of those, before we get to discuss any defenses, if the government proves each essential element beyond a

reasonable doubt, you must convict.

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So let's take a look at Counts 1 through 5 again in the indictment. Those are the Clean Air Act counts. And here's what the essential elements are, and I'm going to go through four with you with respect to Count 5. First, that the government [sic] was an owner or operator of a stationary source of air pollutants; second, that the stationary source of air pollutants was subject to the Title V operating permits program; third, that during the time periods alleged in the indictment, the defendant operated or caused to be operated a stationary source in violation of a Title V operating permit requirement by emitting -what? -- coke oven gas from a pressure relief valve in the by-products department, an unpermitted emission source, and then which was condition 4 of the Tonawanda Coke Corporation's Title V permit; and fourth, that the defendant acted knowingly.

So you're going to have those four elements to look at. Now, follow along with me. I'm going to get you -- I mean, you're going to get a copy of this, okay? Elementally. So, pay close attention to me. But we're going to minimize the danger of your getting lost by giving you a copy that will

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relate to the specific essential elements. But let it sink it. Listen.

So we've got the fourth element that the defendant acted knowingly. So those are the four essential elements that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. That's for Counts 1 through 5.

Counts 6 through 10, same principle applies. Each essential element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and we're going to go through four again. First, that the defendant was an owner or operator of a stationary source of air pollutants. Same, right? Second, that the stationary source of air pollutants was subject to the Title V operating permits program. right? But you have to individually consider each for each count and each group of counts. Third, that during the time periods alleged in the indictment, the defendant operated or caused to be operated a stationary source in violation of a Title V permit requirement by operating the western quench tower. And this is where it starts to differ from the other one, because in the first five you're talking about the emitting of coke oven But here we're talking about operating the

western quench tower that was -- according to the indictment -- and you've heard evidence quench tower number 1 -- at the Tonawanda Coke Corporation without -- what? -- and you've heard about this in the evidence -- a baffle system installed in such quench tower -- and the condition that applies there is number 96 -- of the Tonawanda Coke Corporation's Title V permit, and in noncompliance with any applicable exemption. Okay. So that's the third element. And fourth, that the defendant, like with the first five, acted knowingly.

So, essentially everything lines up, but you're going to have that third element. It's going to be a little bit different, because it has to be tailored to Counts 6 through 10.

Now, let's find out -- what do you think, how many elements there might be for Counts 11 through 15, right? Now, we had one through four on all the others. How about if we have one through four on these counts? And that's the way it works out. But you have to separately consider the groupings. Okay.

But, first, that the defendant was an owner or operator of a stationary source of air pollutants; second, that the stationary source of air

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pollutants was subject to the Title V operating permits program. Same, all right? Let's look at that third one again, because the fourth will be the same that the defendant acted knowingly. The third one with respect to Counts 11 through 15 -and if you remember, we had quench tower 1 in the last five counts. We have quench tower number 2 now in this second grouping in Counts 11 through So that during the time periods alleged in the 15. indictment, the defendant operated or caused to be operated a stationary source in violation of a Title V permit requirement by operating the eastern quench tower, which is number 2 according to the indictment, and you've heard evidence about that, at the Tonawanda Coke Corporation without -what? -- a baffle system installed in such quench tower. The condition here is not 96, like it was in the prior counts, 6 through 10. But this is condition number 97 of the Tonawanda Coke Corporation's Title V permit. And then the knowingly -- committed knowingly requirement. So there you go. Okay.

If you look at it, common sense, experience, intelligence, right? Methodically, you just take it, look at it, address it.

Okay. Let's talk about owner or operator and what that term means. Because remember everybody told you I'm going to be giving you definitions. But when you listen to them, in light of all of the evidence that you've heard, it's really going to gel, okay? It's going to be jelling', to quote a commercial.

And the term "owner or operator" means any person who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervisors a stationary source. Okay. Common sense. But, again, you have to know the specific definition to make it all feel right and be right. All right.

Let's talk about -- you're saying, okay, what does stationary source mean? Let's talk about that. That's our next charge. The term

"stationary source" means, generally, any source of air pollution except those emissions resulting directly from an internal combustion engine for transportation purposes or from non-road engines or vehicles. A major stationary source means any stationary source of air pollutants which directly emits or has the potential to emit 100 tons per year or more of any air pollutant.

The term "major source" under the Clean Air Act

includes a major stationary source that was just defined.

Okay. Now, a stationary source is subject to the Title V operating permits program if it is — what? — a major source. Once subject to the Title V operating permit program, the stationary source must have a permit issued by a permitting authority. In New York, the permitting authority under the Title V operating permit program is the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, the DEC, which is authorized by the EPA to carry out the Title V operating permit program.

Okay. When we're talking stationary source, we agree we're talking about the Tonawanda Coke Corporation, right?

MR. LINSIN: We do not dispute that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, it's not disputed, right?

Just so you know so I can give you context for that stationary source, all right? All right.

Let's talk about some of the terms that we've just talked about that relate to Counts 1 through 5 of the indictment, and they -- and which involve the pressure relief valve. Okay.

Under Title 6 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulation Part 201-1.2, if an existing emission source was subject to the permitting requirements of Title 6 Part 201 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations at the time of construction or modification, and the owner and/or operator failed to apply for a permit for such emission source, then -- okay, and I'm going to give you some definitions, okay? And we're going to talk about owner and/or operator. And that means that the owner and/or operator must apply for a permit for such emission source or register the facility in accordance with the provisions of this part. That's what the owner/operator must apply for under the definitions that are applicable here.

The emission source is as follows by way of definition: Air contamination source or emission source, any apparatus, contrivance, or machine capable of causing emission of any air contaminant to the outdoor atmosphere, including any appertinent exhaust system, air cleaning — or air cleaning device. Where a process at an emission unit uses more than one apparatus, contrivance, or machine in combination, the combination may be considered a single emission source. Okay. That's

what we're talking about when we say emission source.

Emission point is defined as any conduit, chimney, duct, vent, flue, stack, or opening of any kind through which air contaminants are emitted to the outdoor atmosphere. I'm going to give you these definitions too. But stay with me, please.

Okay.

Now construction, that's a term that's defined as follows: The initiation of physical on-the-site construction activities which are of a permanent nature, excluding site clearing and excavation.

Such activities include, but are not limited to, installation of building supports and foundations, laying underground pipework, and construction of permanent storage structures.

That's one of the terms you will have defined for you should you choose to address it and use it properly. All right.

Now "modification" is another definition that I'm going to give you, and it's a rather lengthy definition, so I ask that you pay as close attention to me as you can in that regard.

Modification, any physical change or change in the method of operation of an incinerator,

stationary combustion installation, or process which, one, increases the hourly emission rate, emission concentration, or emission capacity of any air contaminant; or two, involves the installation or alteration of any air cleaning installation — air cleaning device or controlled equipment; or three, involves conversion of fuel used in any emission source to a fuel with a higher ash content than the fuel used prior to the change; or four, involves the alteration of any furnace or other physical changes to allow burning of refuse, or refuse—derived fuel with fossil fuel; or five, results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted or authorized under the permit.

Routine maintenance, repair, and replacement of original equipment or parts thereof are not considered physical changes. Any increase or decrease in the hours of operation is not considered a change in the method of operation if the total emissions do not cause air pollution or contravention of any applicable ambient air quality standard, and the hours of operation are not restricted through a condition of a permit or certificate issued for the air contamination source.

A physical change or a change in the method of operation shall not include the use of an alternative fuel or raw material which, one, the facility or emission source was capable of accommodating before January 6th, 1975, unless change would be prohibited under any federally enforceable permit condition, which was established after January 6th, 1975; or two, the facility or emission source is approved to use under any permit that is issued.

Okay. That's the definition of modification.

I know there is a lot in there. Okay. But the term may come up in your discussions, so you look at the definitions, which will be a part of what I give you, okay?

Now, "process" is the last definition for now that I'm going to give you as it relates to the New York State regulations. And process is defined as any activity involving one or more emission sources that emits or has the potential to emit any regulated air pollutant. Okay.

Now, we're going to get down to the fourth element that relates to that grouping of charges and counts that we've talked about up to this point in time. And I want to give you the definition of

"knowingly". All right. And an act is done knowingly if the defendants are aware of the nature of their acts and do not act or fail to act through ignorance, mistake, or accident. You may consider evidence of the defendants' words, acts or omissions, along with all other evidence, in deciding whether the defendants acted knowingly. It is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendants knew that they were acting in violation of the law, or that they knew of any of the regulatory requirements.

The crimes we're talking about here are general intent crimes. That is, the defendants do not need to know that they were violating the specific terms of the permit or the law in order to be guilty of the crime. You must, however, find that they knew the facts of what they were doing.

For Counts 1 through 5, this means that you must find that the defendants knew that coke oven gas was being emitted from the pressure relief valve in the by-product department. Then you must find this emission was unpermitted and was in violation of the Title V permit. Counts 1 through 5.

Count 6 through 10. This means that you must

find that the defendants knew that the western quench tower, tower 1, was being operated without a baffle system installed. For Counts 11 through 5 [sic], to establish that knowledge element, this means that you must find that the defendants knew that the western quench tower, tower number 2 -- I'm sorry, that the eastern quench tower, tower number 2, was being operated without a baffle system installed. Okay.

Now, remember, we've gone through the elements for 15 counts. Right? Okay. Now, you've heard the argument about the entrapment by the estoppel defense. Let me tell you about that now.

The entrapment by estoppel defense is available to the defendants who can establish by a different proof standard, a preponderance of the evidence — they have to prove it — but by a preponderance of the evidence that the government procured their commission of the illegal acts by leading them to — what? — reasonably believed that they were authorized to commit them. It is a defense to the Clean Air Act violations, Counts 1 through 15, that I have just discussed with you. That's a recognized legal defense. Okay.

The entrapment by estoppel defense does not

negate any of the statutory elements of a crime.

Rather, the entrapment by estoppel defense recognizes that even though the government may have proved all of the elements of the crime to convict the defendant for the acts committed in reasonable reliance on a government official's statements, or on the conduct of the government would -- what? -- have violated due process or, what you heard argue to you, fundamental fairness. Okay. That's how that defense comes into play.

To establish this defense, the defendants must show that they reasonably relied on the statement or conduct of a government official when they engaged in the conduct with which they are charged. Reliance is reasonable if a person sincerely desirous of obeying the law, would have accepted the statement or conduct of the government official as true and would not have been put on notice to make further inquiries of his or her own.

The defendants must also show that they reasonably disclosed the conduct alleged in the indictment to the government before or at the time of authorization. That is -- here's what you must find as a jury -- a connection between the conduct disclosed by the defendants, and the conduct that

the government purportedly authorized. There has to be that connection.

And finally, the government -- the defendants need not establish that the government actually authorized their conduct. They don't have to show that. They must only establish -- what? -- seeming authorization. Seeming authorization. Actual authorization is not required.

But remember this, the defendants have the burden to prove the entrapment by estoppel defense by preponderance of the evidence, which is more than equal evidence. It's not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Lets talk about what that preponderance of the evidence really means by way of strict definition.

I just told you that the defendants have the burden of proofing the estoppel -- the entrapment by estoppel defense -- by what? -- a preponderance of the evidence standard, right?

To prove something by a preponderance of the evidence means to prove only that it is more likely than not true. It is determined by considering all of the evidence and deciding which evidence is more convincing.

In determining whether defendants have proven

this defense, you may consider the relevant evidence or the relevant testimony of all of the witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, and all of the relevant exhibits regardless of who may have produced them. If the evidence appears to be equally balanced, or you cannot say upon which side it weights heavier, you must resolve, on this issue, the question against the defendants. Okay. Because it's got to be more than equal evidence.

However, it is important to remember the fact that the defendants have raised this defense does not relieve the government of the burden of proving all of the elements of the crimes that we just talked about in Counts 1 through 15. These are things that the government must still prove beyond a reasonable doubt. In order words, they have to prove all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Okay. That's Counts 1 through 15.

We'll break it up before we get to those 17 to 19 counts, which is the RCRA counts. Lets talk about obstruction of justice, okay? And that's the one count that kind of breaks synch here, if you will. And the defendants have been charged in this Count 16 with obstructing and endeavoring to

obstruct the due administration of proceedings pending before the United States Environmental Protection Agency. Once again, Count 16 will be given to you so that you can read through it. But, you know, those terms, obstruction of justice, even by their common meaning, defines what Count 16 is. And when you look to Count 16 though you'll get all the specifics in terms of the dates and all of the particular language. And, you know, the particular statute in this case -- as you recall, I gave you some statutory references earlier on the other counts that had to do with the Clean Air Act.

Title 18 is basically the criminal code, and there's a section of that, 1505, which is the obstruction of justice statute. And the law reads this way: Whoever corruptly or by threats of force, or by threatening letter of communication influence, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede the due and proper administration of law under which any pending proceeding is being held before any department or agency of the United States, shall be guilty of a crime.

And you heard the argument with respect to obstruction of justice. But that's the technical

language of the statute, and I'll give you that too. So if you want to look at that particular law, you can, and you should if you believe that would be helpful. Take that Count 16 and look at it, read it through, and you'll get the specifics that you need for purposes of what you have to decide here.

Now, the law is designed to prevent any endeavor -- this is charge number 49 -- whether successful or not, which is made for the purpose of corruptly influencing, obstructing or impeding an agency proceeding. The word "proceeding" encompasses all the steps and stages of the performance by an agency of its governmental functions. It extends to and includes both investigative as well as administrative functions.

The sweep of the statute extends to any corrupt endeavor or effort to obstruct -- what? -- the due administration of the law under which a proceeding is being conducted.

All right. So, now is there a key word in this statute? Yes, and that's endeavor. As used in the statute, endeavor means any effort or any act, however contrived, to obstruct or interfere with the proceeding. It is the endeavor which is the

gist of the crime. Success of the endeavor is not an element of the crime. The word "corruptly" means having the improper motive or purpose of obstructing the proceeding.

Okay. Let's -- that's, you know, we're really talking the definition, right? Now we've got to go -- just like we do with those 15 counts, we need to look at these things elementally, right? Now we have to find out how many essential elements there are that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. This case three, not four. But you have to consider each one, right?

In order to establish whether the defendants are guilty of the charge in the indictment, the government must prove first, that on or about the date set forth in the indictment a proceeding was pending before an agency of the United States.

Proceeding was pending before an agency of the United States.

Proceeding was pending before an agency of the United States. Second, that the defendants -- what? -- knew that a proceeding was pending before an agency of the United States. And three, that the defendants -- now listen to these words -- corruptly endeavored -- remember endeavor -- corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law

under which the proceeding was being conducted.

Okay. Lets break that down further. And it's important. I know this is a lot, okay? But just stay with me, because we're going to talk about those elements and some of the other terms like what does "proceeding pending" mean, just so that there's -- we kind of minimize the prospects for your making any mistake if you reference what I'm going to be giving you and what I'm trying to kind of drum into you right now.

The first element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that on or about the date set forth in the indictment a proceeding was pending before an agency of the United States. In that regard you are instructed that the United States Environmental Protection Agency, the EPA, is an agency of the United States, and further that a proceeding includes an inspection by this agency at the Tonawanda Coke Corporation facility. Okay.

Now, the second of the three elements you have to look to to see if the government as proven it beyond a reasonable doubt is that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants knew that the administrative proceeding was in progress, and you've heard argument about

this. In order to satisfy this element, you need only determine that the defendants knew at or about the date charged that the United States

Environmental Protection Agency was conducting an inspection at the Tonawanda Coke Corporation facility.

And the third and final element before we get to move on, right, because we have Counts 17, 18, and 19, RCRA counts. So it's arranged in a way where it's methodical if you break them down and you group them, and then you look at the elements which will correspond if you look at the four essential elements.

Now that we're here, we're going to the third and final element of this obstruction count. The others ones had four. This has three essential elements. So the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants did corruptly obstruct or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede the proceeding before the Environmental Protection Agency, the EPA.

Now, as I explained earlier, the word

"corruptly" means simply having the improper motive
or purpose of obstructing justice. So, as I told
you, success of the endeavor is not an element of

the crime. All right. Whether they succeeded that's not an element of the crime. The term "endeavor" is designed to reach all conduct which is aimed at influencing, intimidating, and impeding the proceedings. Thus, it is sufficient to satisfy this element if you find that the defendants made any effort or did any act for the purpose of obstructing or impeding the proceeding, right?

Common sense, experience, intelligence. I know there's a lot. But you break it down, you take these terms, you apply them, you look at the indictment, you call to mind the arguments, not as evidence, then remember the evidence, start plugging it in, discussing it, work through it methodically. Don't just get overwhelmed by it. I know you can do it. Common sense, experience, intelligence. Come back with the unanimous verdict, okay? That's the way we do it. Just take it calmly, listen to each other, respect each other's views and work through it.

Okay. Now, I know you're waiting, because we're going to talk about Count 17, 18 and 19 now. These are the RCRA counts that we built the anticipation up to, right? But, again, in the indictment no charge is more important than the

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other, right? You've got to approach them methodically. The different one we just got through, that was the obstruction. Now we're going to be in those RCRA counts.

And let's talk about that, because in these counts we're talking about violations, not of the Clean Air Act, not of the Title 18 obstruction of justice statute, but we're talking about the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, right, RCRA. And that statutory references this Title 42 U.S.C. Section 6928(d)(2)(A). You probably never knew there was so many numbers and letters and parentheses, right, that's associated with the law, but there are. And, you know, they're important for charging because, you know, when you get to those right sections and subsections and titles, that's what leads you to the essential elements that are at issue in the case, which the government says it -- and acknowledges it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. And the defense is saying, hey, wait a minute, the proof doesn't measure up. if we didn't get to the right subsections and sections and titles, you'd be all over the lot. So this is going to keep you focused.

Count 17 of the indictment charges that the

defendants -- or charges the defendants with the storage of a hazardous waste on the ground adjacent to the two large deteriorating tanks at the Tonawanda Coke Corporation without a permit. Okay.

Count 18 of the indictment charges the defendants with a disposal of a hazardous waste originating from in and around two large deteriorating tanks at the Tonawanda Coke Corporation without a permit.

And Count 19 of the indictment charges the defendants with the disposal of a hazardous waste by spreading the waste on to the coalfield at Tonawanda Coke Corporation without a permit.

So you've got to watch the nuances here. But when you read the text of the charge, the indictment, it will come back. It will give you the picture that you've heard the argument about, that you've heard all the proof that's been introduced in this -- in this trial. Okay.

I referenced the statute for you that applies to Counts 17, 18, and 19, to read it in text and as it appears in the book, reads this way: Any person who knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter without a permit under this subchapter

violates the law. Okay. Basically.

Now, let's talk, like we did before, what's the purpose of this law, of RCRA? All right. The RCRA law established a system for managing nonhazardous and hazardous solid wastes in an environmentally sound manner.

All right. That's what we're talking about. When we talk about clean air, we talk about RCRA, RCRA's environmental. You've learned that. That's what this law is about.

And the RCRA law established a system, again, for managing these nonhazardous and hazardous solid wastes in an environmentally sound manner.

Specifically, RCRA provides for the management of hazardous wastes from the point of origin to the point of final disposal, and promotes resource conservation, recycling, and waste minimization.

RCRA's hazardous waste implementing regulations for K087 first went into effect in November 1980.

And regulations covering wastes that were characteristically hazardous for benzene first became effective in September of 1990.

So we're talking about, you know, basically a ten-year period of time for those two laws. Okay.

Now, we're going to talk to you about active

management. The attorneys have mentioned, well, look, the judge is going to give you an instruction on what constitutes active management. That's what I'm going to do now. And you've heard the proof relative to was something active management or not. That's a fact issue, right? So you have to decide with respect to the management of waste under RCRA.

Now, my instruction to you is here is the definition of active management. And you're going to get this. But if you hear it from me, I hope some of it sticks, okay, and then refer to this. You know, be guided by it. Take your time, work through it.

Active management means physically disturbing accumulated waste within a management unit, or disposing of additional hazardous wastes in existing units containing previously disposed wastes. Okay. In other words, it means taking some action to disturb or disrupt contained hazardous waste, or adding hazardous waste to previously contained materials. And if active management occurs after November 19th, 1980, it is subject to regulation under RCRA. Okay. Active management.

All right. Let's talk about the elements just

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like we did with the other 16 counts. All right. With respect to Count 17, in this case you have five elements that you have to look at. All right. Five essential elements that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the defendant -- and you have two defendants. You have to analyze both, right, separately -- actively managed a waste after December 25th, 1990. All right. Second, that the defendant knowingly stored or caused others to store a waste on or about the dates set forth in the indictment. So you've got to look at the indictment to get those dates. Third, that the waste was hazardous as defined by RCRA. Fourth, that the defendant knew that the hazardous waste had the potential to harm others or the environment. In other words, knew that the waste was not a harmless substance, like, for example, uncontaminated water just as an example. Okay. And fifth -- this is where we go now to five elements on this thing -- that the defendant did not have a permit to store the hazardous waste.

So you can tell you've got some work to do, because you've got to take everything that you learned in this case and relate it to each of the individual elements, because they're all essential.

In this case five for these three last counts.

Okay. Well, there will be four in the Counts 18 and 19, five for Count 17. All right.

Let's talk about 18 and 19. First, that the defendant knowingly disposed or caused others to dispose a waste on or about the date set forth in the indictment. So you go to the indictment. You look at it. What are the dates? Eighteen and 19. Second, that the waste was hazardous as defined by RCRA. Third, that the defendant knew that the hazardous waste and the potential to harm others or the environment. In other words, knew that the waste was not a harmless substance, once again, like uncontaminated water. And fourth, that the defendant did not have a permit to dispose of the hazardous waste. All right.

Let's talk about the term "storage". Because under RCRA, it means the containment of -- when we talk about the containment of hazardous waste either on a temporary basis or for a period years. Now we're talking about storage. The term "storage" is defined under RCRA as the containment of hazardous waste either on a temporary basis or for a period of years in such manner as not to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste. Waste

that have already been disposed of cannot be considered to be in storage.

The term "disposal" then is defined under RCRA as the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be permitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.

Now, the government has to prove that the materials referenced in the indictment were hazardous waste. But before you may conclude that the materials were hazardous wastes, the government must prove to your satisfaction that the materials were solid waste.

So the first issue when you approach this to get it into manageable order, the first issue for you to decide is whether the materials were solid wastes. And a solid waste is defined as garbage, refuse, or any other discarded material included solid, liquid, or semi-solid material resulting from industrial or commercial operations. A material is considered discarded if it falls into any of the following four categories.

You've heard these terms for the most part before in the evidence. It is abandoned by being disposed of it; it is accumulated, stored, or treated before or in lieu of being disposed of; third, it is recycled by being reclaimed, burned for energy, recovery, or used in a manner constituting disposal; or four, it is accumulated, stored, or treated before it is recycled by being reclaimed, burned for energy recovery, or used in a manner constituting disposal.

Okay. You know, I know, again, it's a lot.

But, you know, these terms -- I suspect they're really beginning to stick, right? And when you use the text here to guide you, all right, and, you know, you'll eliminate any doubts in terms of the strict definition of the terms, and then you just have to apply it to what you all collectively know the evidence to be in this case so you can resolve those fact issues. That's how you have to prove it.

It's not going to be an all -- undoable. It's doable because -- but you need to take the time, put in the effort. Because like anything worthwhile, you really have to make application to get it done and get it done unanimously. Okay.

MR. LINSIN: May we approach just for a brief --

THE COURT: Yes. certainly.

(Side bar discussion held on the record.)

MR. LINSIN: I apologize, your Honor. I thought we had addressed this. I was -- I wanted to raise a point regarding the next charge.

THE COURT: K087 charge?

MR. LINSIN: It's 62, yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LINSIN: This exception that is discussed in this charge relates both to K087 and the D018 material. That exemption applies to both, and I thought it was something -- I apologize, I thought it was something we had discussed. And I was just concerned to raise this with the Court before reading this. It appears to focus it only on Count 19. It really, in our view and I believe the government agrees, applies to both counts, 18 and 19. The same language, but applies to both counts.

THE COURT: I know we talked about that, and I didn't catch that. But if I just reference this for purposes both Counts 18 and 19, and then I'll make a change in the charge.

MR. LINSIN: And to the extent you are referencing the type of waste, if you could reference the D018 as well as the K087. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. No problem with that?

MR. MANGO: No, your Honor. The D018 has to be that type of waste from the coking process, and I don't think there's any dispute that that D018 is from a coking process. Obviously there is a lot of ways something can become toxic for benzene. But I think we all agree this is a D018 from a coke process, since it's been a coke plant for about a hundred years.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll kind of present it that way. All right. Thank you.

(End of side bar discussion.)

THE COURT: How are you doing so far?

A JUROR: Great.

THE COURT: All right. Good. And, you know, we really do appreciate it. I know I watch you, sometimes even through the corner of my eye just to make sure we keep you in line. But I know sometimes you want to say, boy, can I deal with all of that? And, you know, I guess if I were in your

shoes I'd feel the same way. But, you know, the more I talk about it, the more we go through this, it really is doable. And you have to commit yourself to what you took the oath to do, and that is to really gather yourselves up and make that — that exceptional effort to get a handle on something. When you started out just 30 days ago — I mean, it seems like we've known each other for our entire lives, right? And it's like you kind of pray for a split in the family, I guess, so you don't get to see anybody the next day.

But, you know, and as I started out with you, I mean, I didn't know what the evidence was. But, you know, K087, D018, I mean, those are household terms now, right, that you shouldn't have been discussing with anybody, but I know in your mind they're there, right? And you'll never forget those numbers. And, frankly, if the Lotto didn't turn out the way it was, I think those are key numbers. And you might want to keep that in mind for when you continue to play.

But getting back to this, let me talk to you in terms of those numbers and Counts 18 and 19, okay?

And those are the last two counts. And this charge, this instruction, references both K087 and

DO18.

And for purposes of both Counts 18 and 19, the waste alleged to have been disposed of in those counts is identified in the indictment as decanter tank tar sludge from coking operations, that's what we're talking about, K087. And D018 is waste from the coking process. Did we need to further identify it?

MR. MANGO: Just that have the toxicity characteristic for benzene.

MR. LINSIN: Yes, I agree, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So K087, D018 -- I'll just write -- okay. So, under RCRA, both K087 and D018 are excluded from the definitions of solid waste if the K087 and D018 waste are recycled to the coke ovens. However, the exclusion is conditioned on there being no land disposal of either of the wastes from the point they are generated to the point where they are recycled to coke ovens.

The term "land disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may

enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including groundwaters.

If you find that there has not been land disposal of the KO87 or KO19 [sic] then the exclusion applies, and you cannot consider either as a solid waste. But if you find that there has been land disposal of one or both, then the exclusion does not apply, and you must consider the KO87, DO18 as a solid waste. Yes? Okay.

Lets define hazardous waste lest there be confusion. The term "hazardous waste" as used in RCRA means a solid waste -- all right -- that has been identified or listed as hazardous by the EPA and New York State. A solid waste is a hazardous waste if it is either a characteristic hazardous waste or a listed hazardous waste under EPA and New York regulations. And you've heard that terminology before, right? You never knew that you'd hear that thing so many times. But you have.

Characteristic hazardous wastes are wastes that are hazardous because they exhibit one or more of the hazardous characteristics identified in the regulations such as toxicity. Toxic hazardous wastes are wastes containing levels of certain contaminants such as benzene. If the contaminants

are present in excess of the limits listed when tested using appropriate test measures, the waste is regulated as a toxic hazardous waste. The EPA and New York State have set the regulatory limit for benzene at 0.5 milligrams per liter.

Now, with respect to these charges, the government must prove that the defendants acted knowingly. An act is done knowingly if the defendants realized what they were doing and did not act through ignorance, mistake, or accident. This is going to sound familiar to you.

You may consider evidence of the defendant's acts and words along with all of the other evidence in deciding whether the defendants acted knowingly. It is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendants knew that a particular act or failure to act was a violation of the law. In other words, the government does not have to show that the defendants knew that the materials were designated as a hazardous waste under a particular statute or regulation.

Although the government does not need to prove that the defendants knew that the materials were hazardous wastes, the government must prove that the defendants knew that the materials had the

substantial potential to be harmful to others or the environment.

Now, in order to treat, store, or dispose of a hazardous waste under RCRA, the defendants must have either received a permit from EPA or New York State allowing such treatment, storage, or disposal of the waste, or have been granted interim status.

In order to qualify for interim status, the defendants must have notified EPA or New York State that they operated a hazardous waste treatment storage or disposal facility and filed an application for a hazardous waste treatment storage or facility permit. All right.

Go to that, take a look at it, just to make sure that you know we're talking about these RCRA counts now.

Now, the entrapment by estoppel defense applies here as well. Okay. To refresh your recollection -- we talked about it in the context of what charges? 1 through 15, right? Now we're dealing with 17, 18 and 19.

To refresh your recollection, the entrapment by estoppel defense is available to defendants who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence -- remember that -- that the government procured their

commission of the illegal acts by leading them to reasonably believe that they were authorized to commit them. The defendants have the burden of proving the entrapment by estoppel defense by a preponderance of the evidence, and that means that it is more likely than not true.

Okay. So, we're talking about Counts 1 through 15, 17 through 19. Entrapment by estoppel defense may apply, but the defendants have to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. And that defense applies equally to all of those counts.

Now, there's what's called an aiding and abetting statute, and that's Section 2. And that will appear -- you'll see that number, Title 18 Section 2 appear in the indictment. And that statute will follow some of the other reference to in violation of such-and-such a title and section, and then will be followed by Title 18, Section 2.

And that statute provides that (A) whoever commits an offense against the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or precures its commission is punishable as a principal; and (B) whoever fully causes an act to be done, which, if directly performed by him or another, would be an offense against the United

States, is punishable as a principal.

What that means is under the aiding and abetting statute it is not necessary for the government to show that a defendant physically committed the crime with which the defendant is charged in order for the government to sustain its burden of proof. A defendant who aids or abets another to commit an offense is just as guilty of the offense as he committed -- as if he committed it himself.

So, you may find, for example, defendant Mark

Kamholz guilty of the offenses charged if you find

beyond a reasonable doubt that the government has

proven that another person actually committed the

offense with which defendant Kamholz is charged,

and that the defendant aided or abetted that person

in the commission of the offense.

So, I think you can see the first requirement is that you find that another person has committed the crime charged. Obviously, no one can be convicted of aiding or abetting the criminal acts of another if no crime was committed by the other person in the first place. But if you do find that a crime was committed, then you must consider whether defendant Kamholz aided or abetted the

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commission of that crime. And in order to aid or abet another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the defendant knowingly associate himself in some way with the crime and that he participated in the crime by doing some act to help make the crime succeed.

To establish that defendant knowingly associated himself with the crime, the government must establish that the defendant knew that the offenses described in Counts 1 through 19 of the indictment were committed. To establish that the defendant participated in the commission of the crime, the government must prove that the defendant engaged in some affirmative conduct or overt act for the specific purpose of bringing about the crime. The mere presence of the defendant where a crime is being committed, even coupled with knowledge by the defendant that a crime is being committed, or merely associating with others who are committing a crime is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting.

One who has no knowledge that a crime is being committed or is about to be committed, but inadvertently does something that aids in the commission of a crime is not an aider and abettor

An aider and abettor must know that the crime is being committed and act in a way which is intended to bring about the success of the criminal venture. And to determine whether a defendant aided or abetted the commission of a crime with which he is charged, ask yourself these questions: Did he participate in the crime charged or something he wished to bring about? I'll read that again. Did he participate in the crime charged as something he wished to bring about? Second, did he knowingly associate himself with the criminal venture? And third, did he seek by his actions to make the criminal venture succeed? If he did, then the defendant is an aider and abettor, and therefore guilty of the offense.

If, on the other hand though, your answer to any one of these questions is no, then the defendant is not an aider and abettor, and you must find him not guilty as an aider and abettor.

There's something called venue, and with respect to the elements that we've already talked about, you must consider whether any act in furtherance of the crimes occurred within the Western District of New York. But, you're instructed by me that Erie County and the city of

Buffalo metropolitan area are within the district 17-county territorial area. So in that regard, the government need not prove that the crime itself was committed in this district or the defendant himself was present here.

It is sufficient to satisfy this element if any act in furtherance of the crime occurred within this district.

If you find that the government has failed to prove that any act in furtherance of the crime occurred within this district, or if you have a reasonable doubt on this issue, then you must acquit.

While we are on the subject of the elements — and remember I told you have to take it, look at each count. The indictment will have dates in it. And in that regard, it really doesn't matter if the indictment charges that a specific act occurred on or about a certain date and the evidence indicates that, in fact, it was on another date. The law only requires a substantial similarity between the dates alleged in the indictment and the date established by testimony or exhibits.

Okay. So you got to be close, bottom line.

All right. You're going to get the indictment.

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You know how to use it. It's not proof. And it is your guide for your deliberations and to know whether the government has satisfied its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Tomorrow you're going to start your deliberations, okay? I'm going to let you go this afternoon. Maybe even a little bit earlier than you expected. But it's a little snowy out there, so we'll give you the opportunity to enjoy those flakes. And be careful on your way home. You know, we hope you can get up and running and started promptly. Is it any difficulty for you getting here by 9:30? You can do that? You're used to that. We'll get you started then. We'll probably have you report here, and we'll make sure we're altogether and nothing else is interfering with your getting started. And as soon as you're assembled, if I can get you in earlier -- I don't have a calendar tomorrow, right? -- so we can -- we can start at 9:30. And as soon as we're ready, we'll get you started with the deliberations.

You know, we'll help you in every way we can.
We're going to get all the exhibits assembled.
You'll get everything. I'm going to send in the board with the photographs of the witnesses for

your guidance. And you'll have an exhibit list, you'll have the exhibits. We will ask you to work hard on the testimony. We don't really have a written record of everything that's done here. We'll help out. If you need some help, you know, we will ask you to be specific.

Our communications will no longer be this way for the most part. Once you have your foreperson in place, there will be written communications between you and me. Your foreperson will be required to sign a note, send it to me. I'll look at the question. I'll usually respond in writing. That should resolve it. But if there's more to do, we'll bring you back in here after I discuss matters with the attorneys, and I'll speak to your foreperson. And he or she will make sure that everything gets properly communicated back and forth.

And the reason for that is because you take on a different status when you're in deliberations. I mean, nobody, nobody can interfere with those deliberations. Chris will be around, but he obviously is outside the room. He does not participate. He will not speak with you. You just go about doing your business, because it is that

sacrosanct, that important.

But if there's anything we can help you with, make it a specific as you can. We will try to find whatever you want. But we urge you to just take a deep breath when you start out, and then listen to everybody. If there's an issue, go from one person to another. Just try to get it resolved, work it through yourself, look at that indictment. I mean, do you know anybody that could have repeated the same things so many times as I just did with you? Probably not humanly possible. But you've got the framework. Now you go right into it, and you start figuring out for yourselves how you want to go about getting all these matters resolved.

You know, if we do have communications in the courtroom or by note, don't tell me, if you take a vote, what the votes are. We're not supposed to know that. You have to work through that yourself. That's all confidential information. So you work through it until you get to the point where you can advise me by note, and Chris will carry it to me stating that you have your unanimous verdict on the indictment in this particular case.

All right. Remember your limitations are really just a few, but they're critical, and that

is you decide the case on the evidence or the lack of evidence. You know what the evidence consists of. You have to hold the government to its burden of proof. If you find with respect to the defense that's been argued to you, the entrapment by estoppel defense, you have to be satisfied that the defendant has proven that by a preponderance of the evidence. So you've got to keep all these definitions, concepts, burdens separate. But remember the defendants are presumed innocent until and if proven guilty to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt.

Each of you winds up deciding this case for yourself. I mean, that's -- that's critical here. And, you know, to do that that involves being willing to share your views, exchange with others, being respectful of each other. I mean, you spent a lot of time together. And so far everybody seems to be still healthy and getting along and all that kind of stuff. So very, very important that you continue in that fashion.

Keep in mind that while you decide the case for yourself, you remain entitled to your own opinion.

You know, we urge you to exchange your views.

That's the purpose of deliberation. That purpose,

discuss and consider the evidence, listen to the arguments of your fellow jurors, present your individual views, consult with one another, and then reach an agreement based solely or wholly on the evidence, if you can do so without violence to your own individual judgment.

Each of you must decide the case for yourself, and after consideration with your fellow jurors of the evidence in this case. But you should not hesitate to change an opinion which, after discussion with your fellow jurors, appears erroneous.

However, if after careful consideration of all the evidence and the arguments of your fellow jurors you entertain a conscientious view that differs from the others, you are not to yield your conviction simply because you are outnumbered. But your final vote must reflect your conscientious conviction as to how the issue should be decided. And again, your verdict, whether guilty or not guilty, should be unanimous.

Make sure you stay away from any social media, any publicity, any investigation, anything that is outside of what you've been presented with by way of evidence here in this court.

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You know, we told you from the beginning everything you will need you will hear, see, observe, be given within the four walls of this courtroom. And again, it would be a violation of your oath as jurors to allow yourselves to be influenced by anything outside of this courtroom, including publicity.

Don't have any discussions, no outside contact. If you want me to be more specific -- I love reading this charge, because I'm not sure I'm conversant in all of these. But you must not communicate with or provide any information to anyone by any means about this case. You may not use any electronic device or media such as telephone, cellphone, Smartphone, iPhone, BlackBerry, or computer, the Internet, any Internet service, or any text or instant messaging service, or any Internet chatroom, blog or Web site such as Facebook, Myspace, LinkedIn You Tube or Twitter to communicate to anyone any information about this case or to conduct any research about this case until I accept your verdict.

In other words, you cannot talk to anyone on the phone, correspond with anyone or electronically communicate with anyone about this case. You can

only discuss the case in the jury room with your fellow jurors during deliberation. And I expect that you will inform me as you become aware of another juror's violation of these instructions if that ever happens.

You may not use the electronic means to investigate or communicate about the case because it's important that you decide this case based solely on the evidence presented in the courtroom. Information on the Internet or available through social media might be wrong, incomplete, or inaccurate. You are only permitted to discuss the case with your fellow jurors during deliberations, because they have been here with you, seen and heard the same evidence that you have.

In our judicial system it is important that you are not influenced by anything or anyone outside of the courtroom. Otherwise, your decision may be based on information known only by you and not your fellow jurors or the parties in the case.

Ultimately, what's wrong with that? That would be unfair and possibly adversely impact the judicial process.

So you start, get your jury foreperson in place. And that person will be responsible for

deciding how to proceed with your job that lies ahead and for signing all the communications with me if any of those arise before you're ready to return your unanimous verdict.

And when you do have a verdict ready, you hand that, the signed note to -- well, the note to the court security officer.

Chris, are you going to be here tomorrow?

COURT SECURITY OFFICER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And he'll bring the note to me. And then you'll have the indictment [sic].

You'll take it on a count-by-count basis. You'll date it and sign it as you proceed through each count until you're finished with the full consideration of the evidence.

Remember, your answers to all aspects of the consideration of each count of the indictment must be unanimous, and then we'll take the return of the indictment [sic] in the courtroom. There is a procedure for doing that. I'll explain how that's done. But once it's received, it's difficult to undo, and we urge you to make sure that when you do return the verdict through your foreperson, that it's done by your foreperson in full reference of the unanimous view of each of you and the entire

jury when it comes to a consideration of each of the counts in the indictment.

Okay. That's it. But I do need to speak to the attorneys to make sure that I didn't misspeak or didn't leave something out. Or if there's any problem, I'll get that straightened out. But, assuming there's no problem, then we'll let you go for the day, and we'll see you here tomorrow.

May I have the attorneys come up, please?

(Side bar discussion held on the record.)

THE COURT: Mr. Mango, for the government,
anything that I need to address?

MR. MANGO: Your Honor, I don't know if you need to read this. The one thing I saw that was missed, in charge number 36, which is the Clean Air Act counts, the statutory reference was not read. I know you did read the RCRA statute. The Clean Air Act statute was not read. I don't know if you want to go back to it. We have no preference either way. I just wanted to bring it to your attention that that wasn't read.

THE COURT: I probably won't do that. It will appear in the charge. I've got the numbers there, so I think that will suffice.

MR. LINSIN: We have no concern about

that, your Honor.

Just very briefly for the record, your Honor, I do want to note our continuing objection to the Court's failure to include the intent to dispose element with regard to Counts 18 and 19. And as long as we are here on the point, with respect to the special verdict form, our continuing objection to not including the special findings with respect to the defense as to the applicable counts and not including guidance as to the unanimity, particularly as to which action or activity constitutes active management for Count 17. I've made these points before. I just wanted to make them for the record.

THE COURT: Understood. The record will so reflect.

MR. PERSONIUS: Your Honor, we join in Mr. Linsin's objections.

The additional two comments that I have, I think it goes without saying, on page 90 what goes to the jury will need to be -- very end of that will need to be corrected.

Mine's different, Judge. My page 90 is -- it's what Andrew provided us with. It would be part -- the end of charge 54 where you read the RCRA

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      statute. There's just some --
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               MR. LINSIN: The Court read it
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      differently.
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               THE COURT: I read it differently?
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               MR. LINSIN: You read it would be a
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      violation as I recall, and I think that would be an
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      appropriate amendment or revision rather than shall
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      be punished.
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               MR. MANGO: Well, maybe shall be a crime,
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      leave it at that, instead of a violation.
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               THE COURT: You want me to change -- read
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      that again or just --
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               MR. PERSONIUS: No, I don't think it's --
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      no, just what goes to the jury, please.
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          And then, your Honor, the only other -- we
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      talked about just to make sure that with the 82,
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      however we handle it with the D018 --
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               THE COURT: Yes.
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               MR. PERSONIUS: -- to make that change.
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               THE COURT: Yes. Okay. I can take care
      of that. That's it?
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               MR. PERSONIUS: Yes, Judge.
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               MR. LINSIN: That's it.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.
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               MR. PERSONIUS: Thank you, Judge.
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(End of side bar discussion.)

I'll just tell you what happened. I was overruled. I wanted to reread all of the instructions, and the attorneys overruled me. They thought you might appreciate going home tonight instead. So being overruled, we're going to let you do that. Get a good night sleep. Be safe going home. Be safe coming back. Don't do anything to disturb the impartiality, the openmindedness, the real dedication and engagement that you put into this case, and we look forward to getting you started no later than 9:30 tomorrow morning, okay? All right.

Thank you very, very much. We'll see what time?

THE JURY: 9:30.

THE COURT: Okay. Didn't want to let that go for the last night. We'll see everybody here tomorrow. Yes?

A JUROR: Do the alternates have to come back?

THE COURT: They do have to come back in case somebody else doesn't. That's an added part of the insurance policy. Guys, just hang in there, and I know you've been engaged as well. Okay.

1 Thank you very much. We'll see you tomorrow. 2 good. 3 (Jury excused from the courtroom.) 4 THE COURT: Thank you. You're free to go. 5 But there might be a few things we want to talk 6 about? 7 MR. LINSIN: There is --8 THE COURT: Have a seat. 9 MR. LINSIN: There's really only one 10 question, just very quickly, your Honor. For our 11 planning purposes once the jury retires to 12 deliberate tomorrow, is it the Court's practice to 13 permit us to be on 15- or 20-minute call? How does 14 that Court wish to plan for that? We just need to 15 make arrangements. THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, what I prefer 16 17 is that you're as close in proximity to the 18 courthouse -- I mean, if it's 15 minutes or 19 whatever, that's fine. You probably want to go 20 back to the hotel. 21 MR. LINSIN: We're just at the Hyatt. Ιt 22 should not --23 THE COURT: That works fine. 24 MR. LINSIN: Fine.

THE COURT: But we need contact numbers,

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your cellphone numbers. Anybody wants to stay closer by, that's fine. There's no telling how this is going to go. But by the time we get everybody reassembled, 15 or 20 minutes is okay.

MR. LINSIN: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. MANGO: We'll likely be on the third floor, but I'll leave some numbers to make sure.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PERSONIUS: Your Honor, would you like us to be here before 9:30 tomorrow or at 9:30?

THE COURT: You know, I'd like you to be here a few minutes before just in case there's anything that we need to discuss. You never know, something may happen or I might get a note or something. Having you here a little bit early would be helpful. And then, you know, I think it's a good thing for the jury to see you all here. All right. And then I'll send them back to start deliberations. Except you for, Mr. Mango, you can stay home if you -- no, just kidding. So does that work for everybody?

MR. PERSONIUS: Yes, Judge, is 9:15 early enough, or do you want us here at 9:00?

THE COURT: No. No. 9:15 is plenty

1 early, Mr. Personius. And, you know, I'm confident 2 that we'll do our best to make sure that everything 3 is in order. Colleen will be working with the 4 paralegals because the attorneys have to -- is that 5 already done? 6 THE CLERK: They already signed off. 7 THE COURT: That's great work. We will 8 get everything ready. We'll have it available for 9 the jury. The board with the photographs will go 10 in, and I think, you know, we can't really do 11 anything more than that. You've given it your best 12 efforts. We'll see what happens tomorrow. 13 MR. LINSIN: Thank you, your Honor. 14 MR. MANGO: Thank you very much. 15 THE COURT: Andrew, was there anything 16 else? 17 No, Judge. LAW CLERK: 18 19 20 21 22 23

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CERTIFICATION I certify that the foregoing is a Correct transcription of the proceedings Recorded by me in this matter. s/Michelle L. McLaughlin Michelle L. McLaughlin, RPR Official Reporter U.S.D.C., W.D.N.Y.